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WHY THE NEW YORK STATE SYSTEM FOR
OBTAINING A LICENSE TO CARRY A
CONCEALED WEAPON IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Suzanne Novak*
Introduction
The New York State administrative system for obtaining a li-
cense to carry a concealed weapon violates the state constitution
and the tenets of administrative law vital to a democratic society.
The New York State Legislature has delegated the important
power to grant licenses to carry a concealed weapon ("carry
licenses") to city and county' administrative officials.2 Because the
legislature has not devised sufficient guidelines to implement its
will, this grant of power is improper. Moreover, administrative of-
ficials acting without prop'e'r guidelines proceed beyond their con-
stitutional authority. The license determination process and the
accompanying disclosure rules are unfair to license applicants. As
a result, persons denied carry licenses are not afforded meaningful
judicial review.
This article discusses each of the above-listed failures of the New
York State administrative procedures for issuing carry licenses. In
addition, this article asserts that by avoiding policy determinations,
the legislature has created a system that disadvantages both indi-
vidual applicants and the public at large. Part I of this article ex-
plains the current administrative procedures for obtaining a carry
license in New York State. Part II describes the fundamental re-
quirements of a fair and constitutional administrative system as
well as contends that New York's system for obtaining a carry li-
cense fails to satisfy these requirements. Part III discusses ways to
* J.D., New York University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor
James Jacobs for his encouragement, and Michael Novak and David Pashman for
their editorial advice.
1. A government official, in his or her capacity to grant or deny carry permits, is
acting as an administrative agent for he or she has "the power to determine, either by
rule or by decision, private rights and obligations." See 1941 U.S. ATr'y GEN.'S
COMM. ON ADMIN. PROC. 7, quoted in BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
13, n.1 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter SCHWARTZ, ADMIN. LAW].
2. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(3) (McKinney 1996).
3. This article does not, however, discuss the gun control debate or any policy
changes in New York gun control laws.
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change the current system so that it would comport with these re-
quirements. This article concludes that both the New York Legis-
lature and courts must act to rectify the state's unconstitutional and
undemocratic scheme for issuing carry licenses.
I. The New York State System for Applying for a License to
Carry a Concealed Weapon
New York Penal Law provides that all applications for carry
licenses be made to the city or county licensing officers where the
applicant resides.4 Each city and county chooses who shall be the
licensing officer, and provides the appropriate application proce-
dures for carry licenses.' New York City's application process is as
follows:6
1. The applicant picks up a Pistol License Application from the
police department.
2. The applicant completes the form, which requires a "letter
of necessity," describing the need for a carry license "in con-
nection with a business or profession." He is also required
to submit documentation concerning citizenship, residence,
arrest information, and proof of business ownership.
3. He then has the application notarized and his fingerprints
taken. The fingerprints are cleared by the state in approxi-
mately ten weeks, and the FBI in approximately four
months.
4. The applicant brings the completed application back to the
police department and pays a $170 non-refundable applica-
tion fee by postal money order.
5. An investigator at the police department interviews the ap-
plicant approximately two months after the application is
submitted.
6. At the interview the investigator reviews any documents the
applicant was told to bring to verify the information on the
application form, and reviews the applicant's stated need for
a license.
7. After the interview the investigator writes a report to a ser-
geant in the licensing division of the police department sum-
4. See § 400.00(3).
5. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code tit. 10, ch. 1 § 10-131 (1996) (pertaining to firearms)
[hereinafter NYCAC]; NYCAC tit. 10, ch. 3 § 10-303 (pertaining to rifles and
shotguns).
6. See Telephone Interview with Terence McCormack, Lieutenant, New York
City Police Dep't Licensing Div. (Nov. 8, 1995) [hereinafter McCormack Interview];
NYCAC, supra note 5, at §§ 10-131, 10-303 (providing the authority to develop such
procedures).
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marizing the applicant's asserted need for a carry license.
Sometimes the investigator will personally investigate the
applicant's situation before writing the report.
8. The sergeant recommends issuance or denial to a lieutenant
in the licensing division, and the lieutenant determines
whether or not a license will be granted.
9. The applicant is notified by mail of his approval or disap-
proval. If the application is denied, the notice will state the
reasons for disapproval. The applicant may appeal a denial
to the commanding officer of the licensing division within
thirty days of the denial.7
10. If the commanding officer affirms the denial, the applicant
can file an Article 78 petition and appeal the determination
in the state court system.8
New York State Penal Law states: "[a] license for a pistol or re-
volver shall be issued to . . . have and carry concealed, without
regard to employment or place of possession, by any person when
proper cause exists for the issuance thereof."9 This statute, how-
ever, does not clarify what constitutes proper cause, and no legisla-
tive intent on the matter exists. Further, there are no additional
guidelines to assist the administratiave official in making the
''proper cause" determination.
On the rare occasions that New York courts have interpreted
"proper cause," they have called it "a legitimate reason, a circum-
stance or combination of circumstances justifying the granting of a
privilege."'10 Some courts have held that failure to "demonstrate a
special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the
general community or of persons engaged in the same profession"
is a sufficient basis for denying a carry permit." Other courts have
7. See McCormack Interview, supra note 6; see also NYCAC, supra note 6, at
§ 10-303(e)(1) ("The applicant has the right to appeal pursuant to procedures estab-
lished by the police commissioner for administrative review").
8. See McCormack Interview, supra note 6; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801, cmt.
C7801:1 (McKinney 1994) ("For the most part, Article 78 proceedings are used to
challenge action (or inaction) by agencies and officers of state and local govern-
ments"). See, e.g., Goldstein v. Brown, 189 A.D.2d 649, 592 N.Y.S.2d 343 (1993) (ap-
plicant for handgun carry permit brought Article 78 proceeding challenging city police
department's denial of application); Klapper v. Codd, 78 Misc.2d 377, 356 N.Y.S.2d
431 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
9. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2)(f) (McKinney 1996).
10. In Re O'Connor, 154 Misc.2d 694, 697, 585 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1003 (West. County
Ct. 1992).
11. Bernstein v. Police Dep't of City of New York, 85 A.D.2d 574, 574, 445
N.Y.S.2d 716, 716 (1981)(quoting In Re Klenosky v. New York City Police Dep't, 75
A.D.2d 793, 793, 428 N.Y.S.2d 256, 256 (1980), affd, 53 N.Y.2d 685, 421 N.E.2d 503
(1981)).
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labeled arguments such as spending time in a high crime area and a
general desire to carry a gun for protection as insufficient reasons
for obtaining a carry license. 12 Indeed, an appellate court rejected
the "'high crime area' argument, the logical extension of which is
to 'make the community an armed camp.' "13
Local authorities often create rules in order to implement the
issuance of carry licenses as set forth in N.Y. Penal Law § 400.14
For example, New York City has divided carry licenses unrelated to
the requirements of an occupation into two categories-"Carry
Business Licenses," which are unrestricted licenses to carry a con-
cealed handgun, and "Limited Carry Business Licenses," which
permit persons to carry a concealed handgun during specified times
and to and from particular places.15 The Rules of the City of New
York include exposure "by reasons of employment or business ne-
cessity to extraordinary person danger," and exposure to "ex-
traordinary personal danger, documented by proof of recurrent
threats to life or safety" as factors for consideration when assessing
if an applicant has shown "proper cause" for a carry license.1 6
The lack of guidelines from the Legislature creates problems for
evaluating "proper cause" when an applicant presents a need for a
license unrelated to business. The names of the two types of non-
occupational carry licenses ("Carry Business License" and "Lim-
ited Carry Business License") and comments made by Lieutenant
McCormack, a licensing officer in the New York City Police De-
partment, reflect a general understanding amongst New York City
government officials that "proper cause" refers only to business
needs. 7 Lieutenant McCormack estimated that 99% of the
"needs" put forth in the applications for carry licenses relate to the
applicant's business, including: amount of money carried, past in-
12. See Sable v. McGuire, 92 A.D.2d 805, 805, 460 N.Y.S.2d 52, 52 (1983) ("Nor
was it error for licensing official to reject the petitioner's 'high crime area' argu-
ment"); In Re O'Connor, 154 Misc.2d at 697 (declaring that "a generalized desire to
carry a concealed weapon to protect one's person and property does not constitute
'proper cause'").
13. See, e.g., Sable, 92 A.D.2d at 805.
14. See NEW YORK CITY CHARTER ch. 45, § 1043 (1996) (granting agencies power
to adopt rules necessary to carry out its state law duties); RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK [hereinafter RCNY] tit. 38, §§ 5-01-25 (1996) (regarding handgun licenses).
15. See RCNY tit. 38, § 5-01.
16. RCNY tit. 38, § 5-03.
17. See McCormack Interview, supra note 6. McCormack has made many of the
gun licensing determinations at the New York City Police Department, and was in-
volved in the gun licensing division for fifteen years.
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stances of crime, the surrounding neighborhood, and other danger-
ous circumstances.
A general understanding that "proper cause" refers only to busi-
ness need, however, may be a result of the application's failure to
state that non-business needs will be considered. 18 Indeed, Lieu-
tenant McCormack could not recall one applicant in his fifteen
years with the police department whose stated need referred to the
applicant being a victim of domestic violence.1 9 He indicated that
if he did receive such an applicant he would not know how to han-
dle the matter, but supposed that he would probably meet with a
higher authority, such as the Deputy Commissioner of Legal Mat-
ters, to discuss the situation.2 0 Lieutenant McCormack further
commented that the police department does not issue a carry li-
cense because an applicant's life has been threatened or that he has
been beaten, because those situations "happen everyday."' 21 Nor-
mally, if a carry license is given to a person because of danger, the
order to do so comes from a "higher source" or "other agency. '22
Lieutenant McCormack conceded that because the state legisla-
ture has not issued any guidelines for assessing proper cause, the
system can never be entirely fair.23 While he stated that the police
"try to be fair,' 24 a recent New York City Police Department
("NYPD") scandal involving accusations of favoritism in issuing
gun licenses suggests otherwise. Henry Krantz, the commanding
officer of the NYPD's licensing division, agreed to pay a $10,000
fine and receive a reduction in rank to settle administrative charges
that he had shown favoritism in granting gun licenses, and that he
18. See City of New York Pistol License Application (referring only to applicants
needing a pistol in connection with a business or profession). The application con-
tains a box marked "Carry Business," and requires an explanation of "why the [appli-
cant's] employment requires the carrying of a concealed handgun." Id.
19. See McCormack Interview, supra note 6.
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See id.
24. Id.
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ordered his subordinates to do so. 25 Other officials in the division
were transferred, demoted, or forced to retire.z6
The turnover of city officials also results in inconsistent interpre-
tation and application of the meaning of "proper cause." For ex-
ample, 'Lieutenant McCormack stated that before the police
department developed a "formal system" for reviewing license ap-
plications, the department granted licenses to doctors easily.27
Both attorneys Susan Courtney Chambers and Marc Benison agree
that the standards to obtain a carry permit have become stricter
and tougher over the last two decades, making police department
determinations of such applications unpredictable. 28 Ms. Cham-
bers claims that under Mayor Koch's administration, carrying
$5000 per week guaranteed an unrestricted carry permit, but pres-
ently if an applicant carries $100,000 per week, he might be granted
only a limited carry license.2 9 Ms. Chambers, who represents sev-
eral doctors seeking permits, claims that hundreds of other doctors
in situations similar to her clients' have permits.30
Because there are no guidelines to assist applicants in assessing
the chance of being issued a carry license, applicants might want to
compare their "needs" with applicants to whom licenses have been
granted. This practice would save the applicant time and money
before applying. However, currently, carry license applications are
not matters of public record available for full inspection. In No-
vember 1994, the law was changed to include only the name and
address of persons to whom licenses have been granted as a matter
of public record.31 Prior to this change, New York Penal Law § 400
25. See Leonard Levitt, Deal Avoids Trial/Pistol-License Cop to Pay $10G Fine,
N.Y. NEWSDAY, Feb. 4, 1997, at A7 [hereinafter Levitt, Deal Avoids Trial]; John
Marzulli & Alice McQuillan, Gun Licensing Boss Suspended by NYPD, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Jan. 23, 1997, at 26. (Some felt that Krantz was being "scapegoated because
corruption and favoritism have run rampant within the pistol-licensing division for
decades."); Leonard Levitt, One Police Plaza/Confidential/Pistol-Packin' Partners
Probed, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Jan. 27, 1997, at A23.
After learning of the scandal, I attempted to interview officers in the NYPD's li-
censing division. However, officers in the division informed me that they were under
strict orders not to give interviews unless they received permission to do so. Those
requests were denied.
26. See Levitt, Deal Avoids Trial, supra note 25.
27. See McCormack Interview, supra note 6.
28. See Telephone Interview with Susan Courtney Chambers, Attorney (Nov. 3,
1995) [hereinafter Chambers Interview]; Telephone Interview with Marc Benison, At-
torney (Oct. 31, 1995) [hereinafter Benison Interview].
29. See Chambers Interview, supra note 28.
30. See id.
31. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2)(f) (McKinney 1994).
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had provided that granted applications in their entirety would be a
matter of public record.32 Despite this statutory authority, how-
ever, it was extremely difficult for persons to obtain such records
even before the recent change.33
Procedures for review of licensing determinations are governed
by the New York State Administrative Procedure Act.34 New York
law provides that filing an Article 78 petition35 is the appropriate
avenue for relief in the state court system for an alleged improper
denial of a carry license.36 Because proceedings for carry license
determinations are not required by law to be made only on a rec-
ord and after an opportunity for a hearing, they are not considered
"adjudicatory proceedings. ' 37 Therefore, the applicable standard
is "mandamus of review. ' 38 Under the standard a judge does not
reevaluate administrative decisions, but rather affirms such deci-
sions as denials unless he concludes that the determinations were
"arbitrary or capricious. '39 New York State courts have held that
the responsibility for determining whether a carry license applicant
32. See id.
33. Ms. Chambers, who represented Goldstein in Goldstein v. Brown, see infra
notes 41-43 and accompanying text, has been involved in litigation against the City of
New York since 1991 concerning the denial of her Freedom of Information Law
(FOIL) requests for the full list of the names of the 7,000 carry licensees in New York
City. Ms. Chambers handles many cases in New York City that challenge a denial of a
carry license based on improper cause. She submits that there are so few cases like
Goldstein v. Brown, where the courts are forced to face the inconsistencies in the
system, because it is so difficult to view applications from which licenses were granted
to make those comparitive arguments. See Chambers Interview, supra note 28.
Moreover, a 1987 article in the Village Voice, listing many rich and well-connected
people who have carry licenses, mentioned that the New York City Police Depart-
ment refused to release the application forms. See William Bastone, Born to Gun: 65
Big Shots With Licenses to Carry, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 29, 1987, at 11.
34. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801, cmts. C7801:1, C7801:2, C7801:3 (McKinney 1994).
35. Procedure by which administrative determinations can be challenged in the
state court system, which was previously obtained by writs of certiorari, mandamus, or
prohibition. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801 (McKinney 1996).
36. See Goldstein v. Brown, 189 A.D.2d 649, 592 N.Y.S.2d 343 (1993) (police de-
partment's denial of carry license application should be appealed to court "pursuant
to CPLR Article 78"); Klapper v. Codd, 78 Misc.2d 377, 356 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup.Ct.
1974) (police department's denial of carry license application appealed to court in an
Article 78 proceeding); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801, cmt. C7801:1 (McKinney 1994)
("For the most part, Article 78 proceedings are used to challenge action (or inaction)
by agencies and officers of state and local governments.").
37. N.Y. A.P.A. § 102(3) (McKinney 1996).
38. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801, cmt. C7801:3 (McKinney 1994). Mandamus to re-
view is the modern name for judicial review of "administrative" determinations in-
volving the exercise of discretion.
39. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801 (McKinney 1996); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7803 (McKinney
1996) (providing that only final determinations can be reviewed).
1998]
128 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI
has demonstrated proper cause is entrusted to the discretion of the
licensing officials, whose decisions will not be disturbed unless
shown to be arbitrary or capricious.4 0
If a judge does determine that an administrator's denial of a
carry license was arbitrary or capricious, she can fashion an appro-
priate remedy.41 In Goldstein v. Brown,42 the applicant, who was
denied a carry license, showed that the police department granted
carry permits to others upon less specific proof of danger. 43 How-
ever, despite the court's conclusion that the police department
failed to explain why the applicant was denied a license, the judge
remanded the matter to the administrator for further review,
rather than grant the license.44
II. New York State's Gun Licensing System's Failure to Meet
Constitutional and Administrative Law Standards
A government official, in her capacity to grant or deny carry
licenses, is acting as an administrative agent, for she has "the power
to determine, either by rule or by decision, private rights and obli-
gations. ' 45 Yet, the New York State system for obtaining a carry
license violates all three essential tenets of an administrative
scheme: (i) it does not limit the powers delegated to administrative
officials; (ii) it does not provide a fair system for dealings between
citizens and administrative officials; and (iii) it does not afford citi-
zens a meaningful opportunity to challenge the legality of a licens-
40. See, e.g., Hochreich v. Codd, 68 A.D.2d 424, 426, 417 N.Y.S.2d 498, 499 (1979)
(stating "the applicant [must] satisfy the Commissioner as to the existence of proper
cause for issuance of [a] license"); In Re Bernstein v. Police Dep't of the City of New
York, 85 A.D.2d 574, 445 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1981) (finding "the responsibility for deter-
mining whether an applicant has demonstrated proper cause is entrusted to the dis-
cretion of the licensing official").
41. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7806 (McKinney 1996); see infra notes 268-69 and accom-
panying text.
42. 189 A.D.2d 649, 592 N.Y.S.2d 343 (1993).
43. See id. at 651.
44. See id. (concluding that the police department had failed to explain why the
applicant was denied a license when the applicant showed that carry permits were
granted to others upon less specific proof of danger). One reason for remanding the
decision, rather than granting the license is that New York courts have maintained
that a "denial of a license must be established by evidence where the record on its
face does not establish that the license should otherwise be denied" in order to avoid
anomalous and arbitrary results. Guida v. Dier, 54 A.D.2d 86, 87, 387 N.Y.S.2d 720,
721 (1976) (citing Falk v. City of New York, 41 A.D.2d 530, 340 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1973)).
See also Fulco v. McGuire, 81 A.D.2d 509, 437 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1981).
45. SCHWARTZ, ADMIN. LAW, supra note 1 at 15.
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ing determination through independent review." Moreover,
because the delegation and fair procedure requirements are not
met, the system also violates the New York State Constitution.
A. Delegation of Legislative Powers
1. The Necessity of Standards to Guide Discretion
The authority and duties granted to officials of an administrative
system must be within the constitutional limits of legislative delega-
tion. A legislative body cannot delegate powers that are "strictly
and exclusively legislative," but it can delegate its other powers.47
Generally, the delegation of licensing powers is proper.4 "
The New York State Constitution expressly requires legislative
power49 to be vested solely in the Senate and Assembly.50 "[T]he
[1]egislature cannot secure relief from its duties and responsibilities
by a general delegation of legislative power to some one [sic]
else."51 Therefore, the legislature must create standards to guide
administrative discretion. 2 The only constitutional discretion that
46. See Bernard Schwartz, Fashioning An Administrative Law System, 37 U.N.B.
L.J. 59, 62 (1988) [hereinafter Schwartz, Fashioning].
47. Trustees of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, Elec., Light & Power Co., 191
N.Y. 123, 132, 83 N.E. 693, 695 (1908) (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 42
(1825)).
48. See id. at 133-34 (citing Wayman, 23 U.S. 1, 42-43) (proposing that the long-
standing exercise of powers by government officials should be assumed valid in the
absence of a contrary constitutional provision).
49. See Tropp v. Knickerbocker Village, 205 Misc. 200, 211, 122 N.Y.S.2d 350, 361
(Sup. Ct. 1953) (describing legislative power as "the determination of [ ] legislative
policy and its formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct"
(quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424-25 (1944)), affd, 284 A.D. 935, 135
N.Y.S.2d 618 (1954)).
50. N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The legislative power of this state shall be vested in
the Senate and Assembly.")
51. People v. C. Klinck Packing Co., 214 N.Y. 121, 108 N.E. 278 (1915).
52. See Small v. Moss, 279 N.Y. 288, 299, 18 N.E.2d 281, 283 (1938) (holding that
"such field of discretion must be defined by the Legislature. The Legislature must set
bounds to the field, and must formulate the standards which shall govern the exercise
of discretion within the field."); see also In Re Sullivan County Harness Racing Ass'n
v. Glasser, 30 N.Y.2d 269, 276, 283 N.E.2d 603, 606 (1972) ("[I]t is a well-established
principle of administrative law that to prevent an unlawful delegation of power, it is
incumbent upon the legislative authority to set forth standards to indicate to the
agency the limits of its power . . . ."). Commentators have noted that although the
United States Constitution requires standards for legislative delegations to adminis-
trative officials, in the past several decades federal courts have applied this require-
ment liberally, putting more emphasis on the requirement of procedural safeguards.
See SCHWARTZ, ADMIN. LAW, supra note 1, at 82 (4th ed. 1994) (stating that the
Supreme Court has not struck down a legislative delegation for lack of standards since
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)). Although New York
courts have acknowledged this trend in the federal courts, they still assert that in
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can be delegated to an administrative officer in his power to grant
licenses is discretion regarding the application and execution of the
will of the legislature. 3 If, however, the delegated discretion al-
lows an administrative official or body to create policy or apply
personal standards, it is unconstitutional.54
The importance of this constitutional requirement that the legis-
lature create standards to guide licensing officers is rooted in fun-
damental democratic principles. The orderly processes of a
representative government require legislative bodies to make im-
portant and delicate policy decisions underlying such standards.
Generally, elected officials should remain responsive to the people
they represent. Likewise, the represented show their like or dislike
for policy choices through the electoral process. If, however, the
legislature delegates the power to make important decisions, polit-
ical accountability is reduced 6.5  Furthermore, without standards to
guide and govern delegated discretion, there will be no restraint
order for a legislative delegation to be valid under the New York Constitution, the
legislature must provide guiding standards. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. N.Y. State
Labor Relations Bd., 280 N.Y. 194, 207, 20 N.E.2d 390, 395 (1939) (discussing the
explicit set-up of procedural standards and their similarity to provisions in the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act); see also Rapp v. Carey, 44 N.Y.2d 157, 162, 375 N.E.2d
745, 748 (1978) (asserting that the legislature is powerless to delegate functions unless
it provides adequate standards) (citations omitted).
53. See Beer Garden, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 79 N.Y.2d 266,
276, 590 N.E.2d 1193, 1197 (1992) ("It is of course a fundamental principle of adminis-
trative law that agencies are possessed of only those powers expressly delegated by
the Legislature, together with those powers required by necessary invitation ....
Even when broad rule-making authority has been granted, an agency can not 'pro-
mulgate rules in contravention of the will of the Legislature.'").
54. See Packer Collegiate Inst. v. Univ. of N.Y., 298 N.Y. 184, 189, 81 N.E.2d 80,
81-82 (1948) (stating that a statute that attempts to empower an administrative officer
to license or refuse to license under his own standards is patently unconstitutional);
see also Seignious v. Rice, 273 N.Y. 44, 50, 6 N.E.2d 91, 93 (1936) (holding that the
legislature must erect guidelines for administrative officers to carry out its will); Moss,
279 N.Y. at 297 (holding that "the Commissioner has no power to declare any legisla-
tive policy or to create the standards which govern the grant of a license").
55. See Levine v. O'Connell, 275 A.D. 217, 224, 88 N.Y.S.2d 672, 677-78 (1949),
affd, 300 N.Y. 658, 91 N.E.2d 322 (1950) ("The Constitution of the State and the
orderly processes of representative government require that the legislature should
make such important decisions itself. Otherwise there is no method by which the
people can locate responsibility for such fundamental determinations of public
policy.").
56. See Levine, 275 A.D. at 222 (noting that "the Legislature cannot secure relief
from its duties and responsibilities by a general delegation of legislative power to
some one else").
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upon administrative officials, thereby leading to discrimination or
other arbitrary decisions.57
There are many examples of New York courts declaring statutes
unconstitutional because they impermissibly delegate important
policy making power. In Packer Collegiate Inst. v. University of
State of New York,58 the New York Court of Appeals declared a
statute that required a nursery school to be "registered under regu-
lations prescribed by the board of regents" unconstitutional. 9
"The legislature has not only failed to set out standards or tests by
which the qualifications of the schools might be measured, but has
not specified, even in the most general terms, what the subject mat-
ter of the regulations [was] to be."' 60 Elsewhere, the New York
Court of Appeals found a statute unconstitutional where an admin-
istrative officer "ha[d] the power without check or guidance ... to
veto the entire clause and decide that its benefits shall never be
extended to any case,... or to permit the exemption in one case
and deny it in another precisely similar one."' 61 For that reason, a
supreme court declared another statute that authorized the State
Liquor Authority to prohibit the sale of any or all alcoholic bever-
ages "in its discretion" unconstitutional. 62 As the court said, "[t]he
Constitution of the State and the orderly processes of representa-
tive government require that the legislature should make such im-
portant decisions itself. Otherwise there is no method by which the
people can locate responsibility for such fundamental determina-
tions of public policy. "63
Legislative standards for guiding administrative officials in exer-
cising delegated authority are sufficient if they "are capable of a
reasonable application and are sufficient to limit and define the
[agency's] discretionary powers. '64 However, courts have differed
about how broad those standards can be and under what circum-
57. See Moss, 279 N.Y. at 299 ("the legislature must set bounds to the field, and
must formulate the standards which shall govern the exercise of discretion within the
field. Without the second rule as a corollary to the first rule there would be no effec-
tive restraint upon unfair discrimination.").
58. 298 N.Y. 184, 81 N.E.2d 80 (1948).
59. Id. at 188.
60. Id. at 189.
61. See C. Klinck Packaging Co., 214 N.Y. at 138 (holding a law that authorized an
administrative officer to "in his discretion" exempt persons for compliance with the
statute unconstitutional).
62. See Levine, 275 A.D. at 220.
63. Id. at 224.
64. See Tropp v. Knickerbocker Village, 205 Misc. 200, 211, 122 N.Y.S.2d 350, 361
(1953), affd, 284 A.D. 935, 135 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1954) (citations omitted).
19981
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI
stances standards stated in general or even vague terms will suffice.
As a rule, general standards are constitutionally sufficient only
when it would be difficult or impractical to lay down a definite,
comprehensive rule. 65 When the legislature is dealing with com-
plex technical fields,66 broad delegations of authority to officials
with special expertise are often acceptable.67 At the same time, the
New York Court of Appeals has cautioned that although general
standards may be constitutionally sufficient, an express, or clearly
implied, legislative standard, policy, or purpose must always guide
administrative officials.68
New York case law concerning the validity of delegating statutes
indicates that the "proper cause" standard of Penal Law § 400 is
unconstitutional. Although examples are limited, where courts
have accepted broad standards as sufficient discretionary guide-
lines for administrative officials, they have always pointed to either
the impracticality of delineating standards, or the existence of an
express or clearly implied policy as a justification-neither of
which can be said of Penal Law § 400.
One such example of the impracticality exception dates back to
1908. In Trustees of Village of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas,
Elec. Light & Power Co.,69 the New York Court of Appeals found
that a requirement that gas and electric rates be "reasonable" was
constitutionally sufficient because it would be impractical to state
all the elements that should be used to determine a reasonable
rate. 70 Twenty-seven years later, a statute allowing the public ser-
vice commission to charge public utility costs of regulation when it
deemed it "necessary" to carry out its statutory duties was also
65. See Marburg v. Cole, 286 N.Y. 202, 212, 36 N.E.2d 113, 117 (1941) (noting that
"where it is difficult or impractical for the legislature to lay down a definite, compre-
hensive rule, a reasonable amount of discretion may be delegated to the administra-
tive officials") (citing People ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552 (1905)).
66. See, eg., Marburg, 286 N.Y. at 212 (upholding legislature's authority to dele-
gate licensing of a doctor to the Board of Regents); see also Lieberman, 199 U.S. 552
(upholding the authority of the New York City Board of Health to pass a sanitary
code with criminal provisions regarding the regulation of milk).
67. See In Re City of Utica v. Water Pollution Control Bd., 5 N.Y.2d 164, 170, 156
N.E.2d 301, 305 (1959) (out of necessity, what constituted "harmful pollution" was
properly left to a board of experts who were able to bring to their work a familiarity
with conditions which the individual legislator could not be expected to possess).
68. See Bologno v. O'Connell, 7 N.Y.2d 155, 159-60, 164 N.E.2d 389, 391-92 (1959)
("Administrative discretion must be guided by an express or implied standard, policy
or purpose.").
69. 191 N.Y. 123, 83 N.E. 693 (1908).
70. See id. at 146-47.
132
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held constitutional.71 The court determined that the intent and
purpose of the statute provided sufficient guidelines for making
such a charge.72
In Thomas v. Board of Standards and Appeals,7 3 a statute provid-
ing that zoning requirements could be varied in order to secure the
"public health, safety and general welfare" was upheld. 74 There,
the appellate court found that it would be impractical, if not impos-
sible, to define circumstances that present an appropriate case.75
In addition, the court noted that the administrative officials had
sufficient guidance from the general declarations of policy in other
provisions of the statute.76 Also persuasive was that other provi-
sions of the statute listed factors to take into consideration when
drafting the zoning requirements.77
The New York Court of Appeals has found that the delegation
of power to administrative officials to determine qualifications or
fitness for a particular business, in conjunction with an articulation
of what those qualifications should be, constitutes sufficient consti-
tutional guidance. 78 For instance, in Elite Dairy Products v. Ten
Eyck,79 the court found standards requiring the applicant to be
"qualified by character, experience, financial responsibility and
71. See Kings County Lighting Co. v. Maltbie, 244 A.D. 475, 478-79, 280 N.Y.S.
560, 564 (1935) (holding that granting by legislature to the agency to "ascertain and
determine what are reasonable maximum rates is not an invalid delegation of legisla-
tive authority").
72. See id. at 477-79 (finding the statute's purpose to be collecting expenses for
investigating or valuating property when a proceeding was pending before the
commission).
73. 263 A.D. 352, 33 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1942), rev'd on other grounds, 290 N.Y. 109, 48
N.E.2d 284 (1943) (failing to reach constitutional questions that had been argued).
74. Id. at 359-363.
75. See id. (noting that "it is impracticable, if not impossible to define in advance
with precision the circumstance which present an appropriate case to authorize a
variance").
76. See id. (opining that "a declaration of such policy and of such standards, which
must necessarily be read into [the law] (and every subdivision thereof).., is sufficient
to sustain the validity of these sections").
77. See id.
78. See Elite Dairy Products v. Ten Eyck, 271 N.Y. 488, 494-96, 3 N.E.2d 606, 609
(1936) (stating that while "the Legislature has determined the nature of those qualifi-
cations ... it is not part of the legislative function to determine whether a particular
applicant has these qualifications."); see also Mandel v. Board of Regents of Univer-
sity of New York, 250 N.Y. 173, 176-78, 164 N.E. 895, 897 (1928) (avering "the
Supreme Court of the United States leave[s] 'no doubt that the confiring of discre-
tionary power upon administrative boards to grant or withhold permission to carry on
a trade or business which is the proper subject of regulation within the police power
of the state is not violative of right secured by the fourteenth amendment"' (citing
People ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552 (1905))).
79. 271 N.Y. 488, 3 N.E.2d 606 (1936).
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equipment to properly conduct the proposed business" constitu-
tionally sufficient.8 ° The court explained that any discretion left to
the administrative officer was confined to a designated field "suffi-
cient to properly conduct the proposed business."'" Notably, the
court found that the officer had discretion only to weigh the evi-
dence and determine the facts, not to make policy.8 2
Similarly, in Mandel v. Board of Regents of the University of New
York,83 the New York Court of Appeals found a statute that pro-
vided for the revocation of a pharmaceutical license upon an ad-
ministrative determination that one was "unfit or incompetent" to
be a valid delegation of power from the legislature.84 Of particular
relevance was the fact that the statute provided additional gui-
dance to the "unfit or incompetent" standard. It specifically articu-
lated "negligence or bad habits" as possible considerations. 85
Furthermore, the statute provided explicit requirements, including
adequate instruction and experience, for the initial issuance of such
a license.86
On occasion, New York courts have upheld statutes delegating
authority as constitutionally valid, even though the statute at issue
lacked guiding standards. This rare event, however, is reserved for
instances where courts have found standards expressly stated or
clearly implied elsewhere in the law,87 such as in the history of a
law, its legislative intent, or in the common law.88 For example, in
Trustees of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, Electric, Light &
Power Co. ,89 the New York Court of Appeals upheld a statute per-
mitting an administrative commission to fix the utility rates "within
the limits prescribed by law."9 The court found "the law" stated in
the statute to include statutory as well as common law,91 and found
80. Id. at 494-96.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 495 ("All that is left to the Commissioner is to weigh the evidence
and determine the fact.").
83. 250 N.Y. 173, 164 N.E. 895 (1928).
84. See id. at 176-78.
85. Id. at 175-76.
86. See id.
87. See Barton Trucking Corp. v. O'Connell, 7 N.Y.2d 299, 306-13, 165 N.E.2d 163,
166-70 (1959) (finding delegation of licensing for public cart licenses valid because
standards were implied in legislative scheme).
88. See, e.g., Trustees of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, Electric, Light &
Power Co., 191 N.Y. 123, 83 N.E. 693 (1908).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 146.
91. Id.
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a standard explicated in common law to be sufficient to maintain
the statute's constitutionality.
However, courts have stated that a broad outline, such as the
introduction of an act declaring a "national emergency" or stating a
legislative policy such as the maintenance of "fair competition,"
without subsequent declarations or other expressions defining leg-
islative policy, are insufficient to save statutes without standards. 9z
In Marburg v. Cole,93 the New York Court of Appeals upheld a
standardless delegating statute for the endorsement of an out-of-
state physician's license on the grounds that the administrative
agency, in interpreting the broad powers granted to it, had adopted
a rigid, objective test as a standard.94 The court noted that the nu-
merous circumstances justifying the broad standards, such as the
impracticality of the legislature laying down specific standards, a
stated intent that helped define the standards, a recognizable his-
tory, and the expertise of the administrative agency, likewise sup-
ported the statute's validity.95
Although New York courts have upheld a legislative delegation
which lacked specific objective standards circumstances where le-
gally recognized exceptions were present, the courts have not hesi-
tated to invalidate such delegation in the absence of such
compelling circumstances. Unlike the court in Kings County Light-
ing Co. v. Maltbie,96 which upheld the legislature's delegation of
rate setting because it was "necessary in order to carry out its statu-
tory duties," 97 the supreme court in Novak v. Town of Poughkeep-
sie98 found the legislatively delegated standard of "qualifications as
may be deemed necessary" by an administrative official for a
plumbing license to be limitless. 99 In Concordia Collegiate Institute
v. Miller,1°° the New York Court of Appeals found a village ordi-
nance providing that licenses to erect buildings only be granted
when the building's purpose was "educational, religious or elee-
92. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 416-18 (1935); Darweger v.
Staats, 243 A.D. 380, 382-83, 278 N.Y.S. 87, 90, affd, 267 N.Y. 290, 196 N.E. 61 (1935)
(applying the Ryan rule to New York's Schackno Act, N.Y. Ex. SESS., §§ 781 & 783
(1933)).
93. 286 N.Y. 202, 36, N.E.2d 113 (1941).
94. See id. at 209-12 (concerning the granting of medical licenses to foreigners).
95. See id.
96. 244 A.D. 475, 280 N.Y.S. 560 (1935); see supra notes 71-72 and accompanying
text.
97. Id. at 477-8.
98. 57 Misc.2d 927, 293 N.Y.S.2d 780 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
99. See id. at 928.
100. 301 N.Y. 189, 93 N.E.2d 632 (1950).
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mosynary"1 1 to be invalid. The court reasoned that the ordinance
lacked adequate standards or guides in its descretion.102
The New York Penal Law, which authorizes a licensing official to
issue a carry license when "proper cause" exists, °3 does not pro-
vide reasonably applicable standards. Thus, it is an unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative powers. As the above cases
demonstrate, the New York State Constitution demands that the
legislature not delegate policy-making power, but rather create
specific and objective standards when delegating other powers to
administrative officials. Without further clarification, the "proper
cause" standard does not convey the will of the legislature regard-
ing which situations warrant the granting of a carry license. There-
fore, the discretion granted to administrative officials in making
licensing determinations allows them to make their own policies
and apply their own standards.
Courts that have assessed the validity of "good cause" as a guid-
ing standard for delegated authority have determined that it does
not provide guidance to administrative officials. For instance, in
Nicholas v. Kahn,1 °4 a provision of validly promulgated rules by the
Chairman of the Public Service Commission allowed exemption
from a rule prohibiting employee ownership of stocks or bonds in a
utility when the extent of equity holdings were minimal enough to
constitute "good cause for exemption. 10 5 The New York Court of
Appeals invalidated the exception because the "good cause" stan-
dard granted unfettered discretion to the administrative official.10 6
Accordingly, the court found any denial of exemption under that
standard to be arbitrary or capricious as a matter of law. 10 7 Simi-
larly, in Squire Restaurant and Lounge, Inc. v. City and County of
Denver,l "8 the Colorado Court of Appeals found that a "good
cause" standard, without further regulation, created "no meaning-
ful limits on each hearing officer's selection of criteria for
determin[ation] ....
101. Id. at 196-97.
102. See id.
103. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §400.00(2)(f) (McKinney 1989).
104. 47 N.Y.2d 24, 389 N.E.2d 1086 (1979).
105. See id. at 32-33.
106. See id. at 33.
107. Id. at 34.
108. 890 P.2d 164 (Colo. 1994).
109. Id. at 167. Because Colorado adopts the federal standard regarding delegation,
the court in Squire did not facially strike the statute down as an unconstitutional dele-
gation of legislative power, but rather struck it down as a violation of due process
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"Proper cause," like "good cause," is not capable of reasonable
application, and therefore is not a sufficient standard to guide ad-
ministrative officials in their licensing determinations. 110 The re-
cent scandal involving favoritism for obtaining gun permits in the
New York City Police Department's licensing division'1 ' shows the
lack of restraint on discrimination and other arbitrary action facili-
tated by a "proper cause" standard for making carry license deter-
minations. 2 Additionally, none of the circumstances in which the
New York courts have upheld delegations with similarly broad
standards are applicable to this statute. The courts have upheld
standardless delegating statutes only when it would be both im-
practical for the legislature to lay down a comprehensive rule, and
when the relevant policy was express or implied." 3 However, the
applicable criteria for carrying a concealed weapon is not a com-
plex or technological determination that requires the particular ex-
pertise of a delegated administrative official. 114 This notion is
confirmed by the fact that the official who administers such licenses
varies from county to county. Moreover, that relevant criteria for
issuing a gun license are listed in comparable statutes in other
states illustrates that it would not be complex or impractical for the
legislature to articulate factors for the issuing of carry licences by
administrative officials." 5 The legislature need not create a list of
necessary standards, but need only state factors to be considered.
Given the public's strong opinions about guns and self-defense, the
New York State Legislature should be able to gather constituents'
opinions about the legitimate circumstances for carrying a con-
cealed weapon.
Even if it were too complex or impractical for the legislature to
lay down standards, New York Penal Law § 400.00(2)(f) would be
unconstitutional for failure to convey an express or implied stan-
since the statute and procedures as a whole did not protect against unnecessary and
uncontrolled exercise of discretionary power. Accord supra note 51.
110. See supra notes 102-108 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
115. See HAW. Rnv. STAT. § 134-9(a) (1996) ("show [ ] reason to fear injury to
applicant's person or property"); MD. ANN. CODE OF 1957 Art. 27, § 36E(A)(5)
(1996) ("necessary as a reasonable precaution against apprehended danger"); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 624.714(5)(c) (West 1996) ("occupational or personal safety hazard
requiring a permit"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-11 (1956) ("good reason to fear an in-
jury to his or her person or property").
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dard.116 There are no declarations of intent elsewhere in the statu-
tory scheme or in other parts of the law or history to guide the
licensing official in his determination. 1 7 Furthermore, the statute
does not indicate what subject matters an administrative official
should consider when he reviews carry license applications.11 8
New York law does not provide legislative guidance regarding
how prevalent gun carrying should be, or which reasons are legiti-
mate for carrying a gun. It thus follows that the delegation of au-
thority in Penal Law § 400 is solely to determine important
policy.'19 However, such delegation blatantly violates the New
York State Constitution and basic democratic principles,' 20 and
makes it impossible to place responsibility for a city or county's
gun control policy. For example, New York City officials have de-
termined that danger with respect to one's business may constitute
proper cause for a carry license, while incidents of past threats and
abuse may not.12  But which unelected official is responsible for
such policy decisions, and how can the public let its view on the
matter be known? Voting out an entire administration is one alter-
native; yet, such an over inclusive and drastic measure would not
cure the absence of accountability fundamental to a democracy. 22
This unconstitutional delegation unnecessarily causes carry li-
cense applicants to waste time and money. Because the legislature
has failed to delineate standards for the granting of carry licenses,
116. See supra text accompanying note 68.
117. Cf In Re Preis, 118 N.J. 564, 571-72, 573 A.2d 148, 152 (1990) (looking to
legislative intent to interpret "justifiable need" requirement for permit to carry a
gun).
118. See supra text accompanying note 9.
119. See, e.g., Moss, supra note 52; Sullivan County Harness Racing Ass'n, supra
note 52.
120. See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text; see also 38 RCNY § 5-03 (citing
danger to life and well-being of person, evidenced by threats, as a factor for consider-
ation in issuance of carry licenses, ironically under "Carry Business and Special Vali-
dation Carry Business Handgun Licenses" heading).
122. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 640-41 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Secrecy in a Free Society, 213 NATION 454, 456 (1971)) (declaring "when
the people do not know what their government is doing, those who govern are not
accountable for their actions-accountability is basic to the democratic system"); see
also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 133 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that
"[t]here are simply certain things that courts, in order to remain courts, can not and
should not do. There is no difference between courts running school systems or pris-
ons and courts running executive branch agencies"); Immigration and Naturalization
Serv. v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919, 997 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (opining that "[i]n the
Court of Appeals' view, inaction by Congress 'could equally imply endorsement, ac-
quiescence, passivity, indecision or indifference"').
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people are unable to assess their chances of success prior to initiat-
ing the application process which requires payment. Similarly,
people cannot accurately assess whether they should hire a lawyer
to either determine if an application denial has been "arbitrary or
capricious," or to represent them in a judicial challenge to the de-
nial. The reasoning applied by the Colorado Court of Appeals
concerning a statutory "good cause" standard is applicable here:
"A standard of 'good cause' as the criterion for determining
whether to renew a liquor license, without any implementing regu-
lations, fails to provide sufficient definiteness that ordinary people
can understand what conduct and conditions are required to avoid
having the request refused." '123
2. Ultra Vires-If Standards Are Being Applied,
They Have Been Impermissibly Created by
an Administrative Officer
If officials who issue carry licenses have developed their own
standards for issuing such licenses, they have unconstitutionally
created their own policies and rules. The New York State Legisla-
ture has not delegated the power to declare policy or promulgate
rules to those administrative officials. Therefore, the creation of
such policy or rules violates ultra vires, a fundamental concept of
administrative law which provides that the power of an administra-
tive agency does not exceed that which has been delegated to it by
the legislature.124
An agency's guidelines or policies constitute a "rule" if it is a
"fixed, general principle applied regardless of the facts and circum-
stances of the individual case. 125 In Cordero v. Corbisiero,126 be-
cause a Racing and Wagering Board established a mandatory
procedure applicable to every jockey whose license suspension fit
specific criteria, the New York Court of Appeals determined that
the policy was a rule. 27 Similarly in Sunrise Manor Nursing Home
123. Squire Restaurant and Lounge, Inc. v. City of Denver, 890 P.2d 164, 171
(Colo. 1994).
124. See Schwartz, Fashioning, supra note 46, at 63.
125. Cordero v. Corbisiero, 80 N.Y.2d 771, 772, 599 N.E.2d 670, 671 (1992) (citing
Matter of Roman Catholic Diocese v. New York State Dep't of Health, 66 N.Y.2d
948, 951, 489 N.E.2d. 749, 750 (1985)); see also Sunrise Manor Nursing Home v. Axel-
rod, 135 A.D.2d 293, 296-97, 525 N.Y.S.2d 367, 369-70 (1988) (stating that "a guide-
line established by an agency is considered to be a rule or regulation requiring filing if
it is a 'a fixed, general principle to be applied by [the] agency to other facts and cir-
cumstances relevant to the regulatory scheme of the statutes it administers"').
126. 80 N.Y.2d 771, 599 N.E.2d 670 (1992).
127. See id. at 772.
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v. Axelrod,128 a New York appellate court found the Department of
Health's policy of refusing to reimburse Medicaid providers for
parity items to be a rule, as it was applied without considering
other facts and circumstances relevant to the regulatory scheme.1 2 9
In both cases, the courts held that the rules could not be applied
because they were not properly promulgated.1 30
The New York City pistol license application and rules indicate
that the standards by which administrative officials evaluate carry
license applicants have been created at the local level.13 1 The sup-
posed consistent and predictable licensing determinations that are
issued without any state-issued guidelines lack any other explana-
tion. The delegation of the authority to create such standards to
the local authorities would be the delegation of an inherently legis-
lative power to determine public policy.132 However, the legisla-
ture did not attempt to delegate any power to the licensing officials
to create rules or regulations regarding licenses for guns. Thus, by
creating rules and policy, administrative officials have violated ul-
tra vires. Accordingly, any determination made pursuant to such
standards is invalid under the New York State Constitution.
The formulation of standards by each licensing officer creates se-
rious practical problems aside from the constitutional ones. Yet,
different officials in different parts of the state set up their own
standards, leading to anomalous results depending on the appli-
cant's county of residence. 133 The existence of the state promul-
gated "proper cause" standard indicates that all New York State
applicants must be governed by the same standard.13 4 Moreover,
under the current system, a licensing officer could decide to limit
128. 135 A.D.2d 293, 525 N.Y.S.2d 367.
129. Id. at 295-96.
130. See Cordero, 80 N.Y.2d at 772 (holding that "the Saratoga policy could not be
applied it was not formally promulgated by respondent pursuant to the rule-making
procedures set forth in State Administrative Procedure Act § 202"); Sunrise Manor,
135 A.D.2d at 295-96 (noting that the rule was not published by the Department of
Health-a requirement of all administrative rules).
131. See, e.g., City of New York Pistol License Applications (referring only to appli-
cants needing a pistol in connection with a business or profession); see supra notes 10-
25 and accompanying text.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 119-122.
133. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Sergeant Louis LaPietra, New York City
Police Dep't Licensing Div. (Mar. 4, 1997) [hereinafter LaPietra Interview] ("New
York City has the most restrictive policy in the state towards issuing carry licenses.").
134. Cf Schwanda v. Bonney, 418 A.2d 163, 166 (Me. 1980) (reasoning that "anom-
alous results" that would result from imposition of additional local requirements to
state imposed requirements for obtaining license to carry concealed weapon indicates
that legislature intended to preempt local regulation).
140
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the number of licenses granted to a predetermined number, or
choose to giant no licenses at all as a matter of his own policy. The
New York Court of Appeals, however, has declared such policies
an invalid abuse of discretion. Most notably, in Picone v. Commis-
sioner of Licenses, 35 an administrative official had authority to
grant licenses. 36 Logically, little difference exists between a licens-
ing officer independently setting a pre-determined number of
licenses or deciding not to grant any licenses, and one deciding to
grant very few licenses-a policy employed in some counties for
carry licenses. 37 Moreover, such standards would be subject to the
turn of the administration.138 An administrative system in which
the notion of "proper cause" changes every four years, without no-
tice, cannot be considered fair or democratic.
B. The System Violates Due Process for Lack of
Fair Procedures
The New York State Constitution provides that a person may not
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.' 39 The Court of Appeals, when deciding a case under the New
York Constitution, identified "due process" as a flexible concept
that "embraces fundamental rights and immutable principles of
justice."' 4 ° One of the principles that due process encompasses is a
"guarantee of fair procedure."'' In dealings between citizens and
administrative agencies, this notion is a vital component of an ad-
ministrative law system.' 42 Agencies must comport with fair proce-
dures to avoid "arbitrary and capricious decision[] [making]
135. Picone v. Comm'r of Licenses of New York City, 241 N.Y. 157, 149 N.E. 336
(1925).
136. Id. at 338 (finding no difference between an administrative officer limiting the
number of junk boat licenses granted and the officer adopting a policy that no licenses
whatsoever should be granted, and stating that both are matters of public policy that
cannot be made by administrative officers).
137. See LaPietra Interview, supra note 133 (New York City grants far fewer carry
licenses than other counties, and that the policy soon will become even stricter).
138. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
139. See N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6.
140. People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 520, 378 N.E.2d 78, 82, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714,
718 (1978) (citing People v. Terra, 303 N.Y. 332, 334, 102 N.E.2d 576, 578 (1951)).
141. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990); see also Amsden v. Moran, 904
F.2d 748, 753 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 125); Miller v. J.W. Fair-
man, 872 F. Supp. 498, 502 (N.D. 111. 1994); Poe v. Charlotte Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 374 F.
Supp. 1302, 1311 (W.D.N.C. 1974); Levine v. Maverick County Water Control & Im-
provement Dist. No. 1, 884 S.W.2d 790, 795 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
142. See Schwartz, Fashioning supra note 46, at 62, 67-69 (1988).
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violative of due process."' 43 The legislative intent of the New York
State Administrative Procedure Act acknowledges the necessity of
fair procedure, stating: "[t]his act guarantees that the actions of ad-
ministrative agencies conform with sound standards developed in
this state and nation since their founding through constitutional,
statutory and case law. It insures that equitable practices will be
provided to meet the public interest. ' 144 The New York system for
obtaining a carry license, however, fails to meet the State Adminis-
trative Procedure Act guarantee and the state constitution's re-
quirements of due process.
1. Pre-Determination Hearing Requirement
Both the federal and New York courts have ascribed two differ-
ent standards toward the requirements of fair procedure, depend-
ing upon which function of an administrative agency,14s
adjudication or rule-making, is at issue.146 Conformity with the ba-
sic judicial standards of preceding notice and opportunity to be
heard are usually considered essential to administrative adjudica-
tions,1 47 but are not an inherent part of administrative rule mak-
ing. 48 Due process requires such safeguards for administrative
rulemaking only in certain situations.1 49 Yet, the delineation of ad-
143. Illinois v. United States, 371 F. Supp 1136, 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1976). Although the
requirement of fundamental fairness in administrative actions is the theory behind
due process, the necessity of this component does not need to be based on a constitu-
tional provision. See Schwartz, Fashioning, supra note 46, at 67-69.
144. N.Y. A.P.A. § 100 (McKinney 1996).
145. See Bernard Schwartz, Procedural Due Process in Federal Administrative Law,
25 N.Y.U. L. REv. 552, 556-57 (1950) [hereinafter Schwartz, Procedural Due Process].
146. See SCHWARTZ, ADMIN. LAW supra note 1.
147. See Schwartz, Procedural Due Process supra note 145, at 554.
148. See id. at 558; see also Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441 (1915); Villani
v. Berle, 91 Misc.2d 603, 606, 398 N.Y.S.2d 796, 800 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (stating that "I am
not persuaded, however, that the Act in question, [the Administrative Procedure Act]
... creates an absolute right to a public hearing in all actions by administrative
agencies").
149. Bernard Schwartz has articulated that due process normally requires the pro-
cedural safeguards of notice and a hearing when a rule applies to particular, defined
parties, regardless of its label as legislative action. See Schwartz, Procedural Due Pro-
cess supra note 145, at 563.
Regardless of whether an administrative action requires a hearing, other proce-
dures are held to be fundamental to agency decision making. Agency "decisions"
affecting specific parties must be established by evidence. See Guida v. Dier, 54
A.D.2d 86, 87, 387 N.Y.S.2d 720, 721 (1976). An agency must make and express both
"basic" and "ultimate" findings (fact determinations and conclusions drawn there-
from). See Falk v. City of New York, 41 A.D.2d 530, 340 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1973); see also
Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194 (1931); Witchita R.R. & Light Co. v. Public
Utils. Commn., 260 U.S. 48, 58-9 (1922) ("When ... an administative agency is re-
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ministrative actions into two distinct categories is insufficient for
determining whether a particular administrative action requires a
hearing. Administrative agencies also perform ministerial acts' 50
which do not require hearings.1 51 Moreover, certain administrative
actions, such as licensing, do not clearly fall into either an adjudica-
tory or rule-making category but rather fall in between.1 5 2
There are conflicting definitions and case law regarding whether
licensing determinations should be considered adjudicatory (judi-
cial or quasi-judicial in nature), and also whether such a label
should be the only factor considered in determining whether due
process requires a pre-determination hearing opportunity. More-
over, no New York State court has specifically commented on the
nature of a determination for the issuance of a carry license.
Whether licensing is adjudicatory, however, must be determined in
order to assess which procedures due process requires in applying
for a carry license. If licensing is adjudicatory, then a hearing is
required. If it is not, then one must consider whether other factors
require procedures for a carry license application to include an op-
portunity for a hearing.
quired as a condition precedent to an order, to make a finding of facts, the validity of
the order must rest upon the needed finding."); Carolina Power Co. v. FERC, 716
F.2d 52, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stating that "[i]t is hornbook law that an agency must set
forth clearly the basis of reaching its decision"). Those parties must then be notified of
the decision and premises on which it was based. See Guida, 54 A.D.2d at 87. Ac-
cordingly, the New York State Penal Law states that a pistol license shall either be
issued, or the licensing officer shall deny the application and state the reasons there-
fore in writing. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(4-a) (McKinney 1996). In addition,
agency action that affects the public must notify the citizenry by publication. See N.Y.
A.P.A. § 202 (McKinney 1996).
150. A ministerial act is "[t]hat which is done under the authority of a superior;
opposed to judicial. That which involves obedience to instructions, but demands no
special discretion, judgment or skill .... " A ministerial act is also "[o]ne which a
person or board performs under a given state of facts in a prescribed manner in obedi-
ence to the mandate of legal authority without regard to or the exercise of his or their
own judgment upon the propriety of the act being done." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
996 (6th ed. 1990).
151. See In Re Sabrina Corp. v. Jones, 199 A.D.2d 396, 397, 605 N.Y.S.2d 320, 321
(1993) (holding that the adoption of a resolution was a ministerial function, author-
ized by statute and therefore no hearing was required); see also Jewett v. Luau-Nyack
Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 298, 306, 291 N.E.2d 123, 128 (1972) (declaring "a resolution deals
with matters of a temporary or special nature, where the action taken generally in-
volves findings of fact and may be characterized as administrative); Tropp v. Knicker-
bocker Village, 205 Misc. 200, 213, 122 N.Y.S.2d 350, 362-63 (1953), affd, 284 A.D.
935, 135 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1954) (finding that no hearing on the question of a rent in-
crease was not a violation of plaintiff's due process rights because the issue was re-
duced to a ministerial function).
152. See Bernard Schwartz, Procedural Due Process supra note 145, at 557.
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There is no strict formula for determining whether an act is adju-
dicatory in nature. The New York courts have identified certain
characteristics of judicial acts which support classifying carry li-
censing determinations as adjudicatory. The New York Court of
Appeals has stated that the "[e]ssence of a judicial proceeding is
that it decides something, and that its decision is conclusive on the
parties. '153 In Nash v. Brooks,'54 an appellate court determined
that a medical board that passes upon medical examinations, and
investigates and reports its conclusions and recommendations, is
performing at least a quasi-judicial act.155 That court stated, "[t]o
adjudicate upon, and protect the rights and interests of individual
citizens, and to that end to construe and apply the law, is ... in its
nature a judicial act."' 56 The New York Court of Appeals has
stated that the important criteria in ascertaining whether a pro-
ceeding is judicial are: "(1) the presence of parties, (2) the trial and
determination of issues, and (3) a final order of judgment of rights,
duties or liabilities.' 1 57 Another court explained that "[t]o pass
upon and make findings of fact, to exercise discretion in relation to
them and to direct the entry of judgment are powers characteristic
of judicial conduct.' 1 58 Courts have asserted that the opposite is
also true-that the lack of an investigation, trial, opportunity for a
hearing, an opportunity to present witnesses or evidence, and an
adjudication of rights or liabilities is indicative of nonjudicial
behavior. 59
Other theories further support the characterization of licensing
as adjudicatory. Many commentators, and one New York court,
have found the element of applicability to be determinative of
153. Metz v. Maddox, 189 N.Y. 460, 472, 82 N.E. 507, 512 (1907).
154. 251 A.D. 616, 297 N.Y.S. 853, order modified, 11 N.E.2d 545 (1937).
155. See id. at 617; see also BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1245 (6th ed. 1990) (defining
quasi-judicial act as "[a] judicial act performed by one not a judge").
156. See Nash, 251 A.D. at 618 (quoting 1 THOMAS COOLEY, COOLEY's CONSTITU-
TIONAL LIMITATIONS 183-85 (8th ed.)).
157. In Re Klein, 309 N.Y. 474, 481, 131 N.E.2d 888, 891-92 (1956).
158. Copacabana v. Portfolio, 182 Misc. 976, 979, 50 N.Y.S.2d 243, 246 (Sup. Ct.
1944).
159. See In Re Klein, 309 N.Y. at 480-84 ("'[A] judicial inquiry investigates, de-
clares and enforces liability as they stand on past facts and under laws as supposed to
exists."' (quoting Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908)));
Schau v. McWilliams, 185 N.Y. 92, 97, 77 N.E. 785, 786 (1906) (noting that the lack of
witness testimony evinces non-judicial behavior); City of New York v. Maltbie, 53
N.Y.S.2d 234, 240, affid, 269 A.D. 662, 53 N.Y.S.2d 953, affd, 294 N.Y. 931, 63 N.E.2d
119 (1945) (noting that notice and hearing requirements evince a judicial proceeding).
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whether an administrative action is legislative or judicial. 6 ' This
theory has been explained as follows: "a rule is a determination of
general applicability, addressed to indicated but unnamed and un-
specified persons or situations; a decision, on the other hand, ap-
plies to specific individuals or situations.' 161 Under that definition,
licensing would be considered judicial in nature because it applies
to a specific individual.'62 Other aspects of licensing that have led
some New York courts to characterize licensing as judicial in na-
ture are the ascertainment of past or present facts and the discre-
tion in relation to them to direct a final order or judgment of rights,
duties or liabilities. 63
Justice Holmes' description of the difference between legislative
and judicial functions in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Company,'64
however, supports the non-judicial classification of licensing.
Holmes declared:
[a] judicial inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities
as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed
already to exist. That is its purpose and end. Legislation on the
other hand looks to the future and changes existing conditions
by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part
of those subject to its power. 165
By that definition, licensing, which has a future effect, is not judi-
cial in nature; rather it should be considered a rule. 66
Some courts have characterized certain licensing determinations
as administrative 67 or ministerial, 68 rather than as adjudicatory or
rule-making in nature. These courts have concluded that such acts
160. Schwartz, Procedural Due Process, supra note 145, at 557 (quoting Fuchs, Pro-
cedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52 HARV. L. REV. 259, 265 (1938)) (emphasis
in original); see also Van Allen v. McCleary, 211 N.Y.S.2d 501, 509 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
161. See Schwartz, Procedural Due Process, supra note 145 at 557.
162. Id. at 557-58; see also Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N.Y. 461, 467, 121 N.E.2d 421,
424-25 (1954) (finding "[a] license to operate an automobile is of great value to the
individual and may not be taken away except by due process").
163. See Hecht, 307 N.Y. at 467; see also Copacabana, 182 Misc. at 979.
164. 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
165. Id. at 226.
166. See Schwartz, Procedural Due Process, supra note 145, at 557; In Re Klein, 309
N.Y. at 480-84 (1956).
167. "Those acts which are necessary to be done to carry out legislative policies and
purposes already declared by the legislative body or such as are devolved upon it by
the organic law of its existence." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 45 (6th ed. 1990).
168. See Tropp v. Knickerbocker Village, 205 Misc. 200, 213-14, 122 N.Y.S.2d 350,
363 (1953), affd,, 284 A.D. 935, 135 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1954). See supra note 150 for the
definition of "ministerial."
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do not require a pre-determination hearing. 169 In Gimprich v.
Board of Education of New York, 7 ' the New York Court of Ap-
peals surveyed several New York cases concluding that an agency's
exercise of discretion was not determinative of whether an action
was ministerial or quasi-judicial.' 7' A New York appellate division
court stated that an application for a license to practice a profes-
sion is not considered judicial in nature, "but rather executive, ad-
ministrative or ministerial.' 72 One commentator on New York
law referred to the initial denial of a license as administrative and
the revocation of an existing license as quasi-judicial, thereby con-
cluding that the former does not require a hearing, while the latter
does. 73 Although no New York court has commented specifically
on the nature of a determination regarding the issuance of a carry
license, the Colorado Court of Appeals recently held that such a
determination is more administrative than judicial in nature. 74
Regardless of whether particular administrative actions are adju-
dicatory or legislative in nature, some courts have looked to other
criteria to determine whether due process requires an opportunity
for a pre-determinative hearing. Several decades ago, courts stated
that due process requires a pre-determination hearing only when a
liberty or property "right," rather than a "privilege," was at is-
sue. 175 Under this approach, New York courts concluded that be-
cause citizens had a property right in their occupations, due process
required notice and a hearing for a licensing determination con-
cerning an occupation. 176
169. See Tropp, 122 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
170. 306 N.Y. 401, 118 N.E.2d 578 (1954).
171. See id. at 406 (citing Whitten v. Gaynor, 152 A.D. 506, 511, 137 N.Y.S. 360, 363
(1912); People ex rel. McNulty v. Maxwell, 108 N.Y.S. 49, 52 (1908); In Re Walker, 74
N.Y.S. 94, 96 (1902)).
172. Siegel v. Mangan, 16 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1002, 258 A.D. 448, 449-50, affid, 283 N.Y.
557, 27 N.E.2d 280 (1940).
173. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7803, cmt. C7803:1 (McKinney 1994).
174. See Miller v. Collier, 878 P.2d 141, 145 (Colo. 1994) (affirming trial court's
decision when it held that denial of permit to carry concealed weapon was appropri-
ate because the decision was administrative and not quasi judicial as plaintiff alleged).
175. See Cafeteria Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) (noting that
even if a civilian had no constitutional right to be on a military establishment in the
first place, she nonetheless could be deprived of liberty or property in violation of the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment by withdrawal of permission for her to
enter the establishment).
176. See Hecht, 307 N.Y. at 469; see also Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254
U.S. 443 (1921) (stating that "complaintants's business.., is a property right, entitled
to protection against unlawful injury or interference"). See also Truax v. Corrigan,
257 U.S. 312 (1921) (observing that "plaintiff's business is a property right" and that
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However, since the Supreme Court rejected the right-privilege
distinction as determinative of due process rights in 1972,177 New
York courts have either cursorily described an issue as pertaining
to a "right" without engaging in detailed analysis, or have looked
to other factors to determine the necessity of a due process hearing
without mentioning the right-privilege distinction. When discuss-
ing an application for a trailer permit in Calhoun v. Town Board of
Saugerties,178 a New York supreme court stated that "there is no
question but that the ...Town Board's decision . . . affected a
property right of petitioners Calhoun, and that minimal due pro-
cess requirements require that some notice and opportunity to be
heard before the Town Board should have been given to petition-
ers before a decision was rendered. ' 179 However, in Sedutto v. City
of New York, Dep't of Personnel,180 another New York supreme
court rejected the right-privilege doctrine in light of the Supreme
Court's rejection of it.' 81
Other courts have not even attempted to delineate objective cri-
teria for determining whether an administrative action requires a
pre-determination hearing, but rather have delved considerably
into the factual circumstances of the case. While discussing due
process requirements, the D.C. Court of Appeals stated that "pro-
cedures due one person in one situation are not mechanically the
same as those due another in a different context.' 18 2 The court
further stated that in order to determine the parameters of the pro-
cedures required by due process, it must balance the governmental
interests with the individual's interests, making inquiries such as:
"How was the individual likely to be hurt?; What governmental
interest was to be protected?; and, How would the governmental
interest be affected, if at all, by extending procedural safeguards to
cover the challenged action?' 1 83 The New York Court of Appeals
has stated that while certain procedural rights, such as a pre-deter-
deprivation of that right without due process is "wholly at variance" with the Four-
teenth Amendment).
177. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 571 n.9 (1972) (stating that the Court has rejected the concept that constitutional
rights turn upon whether a government benefit is characterized as a "right" or as a
"privilege").
178. 94 Misc.2d 78, 404 N.Y.S.2d 61 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
179. Id. at 80.
180. 106 Misc. 2d 304, 304, 431 N.Y.S.2d 654, 654 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
181. See id. at 309 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) and Gra-
ham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)).
182. Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
183. Id. at 579-80.
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mination hearing, may be available to a party who has lost a pre-
existing right or privilege, they may not be available to a person
first applying for the right or privilege.8 4
Some New York State courts have determined that a hearing was
constitutionally required before a licensing decision was made. In
Sedutto,8 5 the court determined that because of the sharp factual
questions the situation raised, a hearing was constitutionally neces-
sary before petitioner's application for a boiler engineer license
could be denied.'86 In Augat v. Dowling,187 a New York supreme
court determined that due process required a hearing before peti-
tioner's license to operate an adult care facility could be revoked
because of the nature of the allegations and their surrounding cir-
cumstances. 18 In those two cases, however, the courts stated that
due process would not require a hearing in all such applications
and revocations, but that its necessity was dependent on the indi-
vidual circumstances of each case.' 9 When considering the revoca-
tion of a cash payroll guard's license to carry a pistol in Wrona v.
Donovan,190 an appellate division court stated that "[b]y virtue of
the fact that petitioner's employment requires him to carry a gun
S.. due process requires a hearing on whether his pistol permit
should be revoked."' 91
One commentator on the New York State Administrative Proce-
dure Act stated that the act "is a major dissent from the trend to-
wards excessive judicialization.' '19 2 Based on legislative reports, he
stated that "the Act avoided imposing a judicial model on decision
making where it has not previously been employed, where the pub-
lic has a large stake in preserving or fostering a high quality of
technically complex decision making,"'1 93 where there is an absence
of an accusation of wrongdoing, and "where no demonstration has
been made either that preexisting procedures have been widely re-
184. See Sumpter v. White Plains Hous. Auth., 29 N.Y.2d 420, 425, 278 N.E.2d 892,
894 (1972) (rejecting housing applicant's contention of entitlement to a hearing on
eligibility).
185. 106 Misc.2d 304, 431 N.Y.S.2d 654 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
186. Id. at 309-10.
187. 161 Misc.2d 225, 225, 613 N.Y.S.2d 527, 527 (Sup. Ct. 1994).
188. Id. at 230.
189. See id.; see also Sedutto, 106 Misc.2d at 309-10.
190. 88 A.D.2d 998, 998, 451 N.Y.S.2d 834, 834 (1982).
191. Id. at 998.
192. Daniel J. Gifford, The New York State Administrative Procedure Act: Some
Reflections Upon its Structure and Legislative History, 26 BuiF. L. REV. 589, 590 & n.8
(1977).
193. Id. at 620.
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sented as unjust by private parties, or that further judicialization
would be likely to improve the quality of the substantive deci-
sions. '194 The foregoing cases and comments highlight the notion
that the nature of the license at issue, as well as an individual's
circumstances, are often considered when determining the fairness
and constitutionality of an administrative licensing procedure when
no opportunity for a hearing is provided.
Although they do not fall neatly into any one discrete classifica-
tion, licensing proceedings are much more quasi-judicial than legis-
lative or administrative in nature. 195 Therefore, the notions of
fundamental fairness inherent in the due process requirements of
the New York State Constitution require that an opportunity for a
pre-determination hearing be given to carry license applicants.
Although licensing proceedings are not full judiciary determina-
tions made in a court of law, they are adjudicatory in the sense that
they are final orders applicable to specific individuals after the as-
certainment of past and present facts. 196 Although the determina-
tions are applicable in the future, they are not legislative, as they
do not apply generally to others seeking a carry license. 97 More-
over, because the licensing official has wide discretion in deciding
whether an applicant has shown proper cause for the issuance of a
carry license' 98 such determinations should not be considered ad-
ministrative or ministerial.
An examination of the procedures presently used in licensing de-
terminations should not be determinative of whether an adminis-
trative act is adjudicatory. The purpose of determining whether or
not such an administrative act is adjudicatory is to accurately and
fairly conclude which procedures should be afforded based on that
characterization, and to ensure the implementation of such proce-
dures. However, New York law sometimes uses the existence or
absence of the procedures as the basis of determining whether a
proceeding is adjudicatory. According to the New York State Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, the provisions of the chapter concern-
ing adjudicatory proceedings are applicable only "[w]hen licensing
is required by law to be preceded by notice and opportunity for [a]
hearing."'199 That implies that the State legislature does not con-
194. Id.
195. See Hecht, 307 N.Y. at 469.
196. See supra notes 158-163 and accompanying text.
197. See infra Part II.B.
198. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. See also Hecht, 307 N.Y. at 469;
Copacabana, 182 Misc. at 979.
199. See N.Y. A.P.A. § 401(1) (McKinney 1996).
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sider licensing to carry concealed weapons to be adjudicatory be-
cause the law does not require an opportunity for a
predetermination hearing. The New York courts have used the ab-
sence of other criteria, such as an investigation, trial, opportunity
for a hearing, and an opportunity to present witnesses or evidence,
as indicative that licensing is not adjudicatory in nature. 00 This
type of circular reasoning-using the existence or absence of pro-
cedures to determine whether an act is adjudicatory-should be
avoided; for the purpose of ascertaining whether an act is adjudica-
tory is to determine which procedures must be instituted.
Even if carry license determinations are not considered to be ad-
judicatory proceedings, their nature mandates that the opportunity
for a pre-determination hearing be provided. Although there is no
right to carry a concealed weapon in New York,2"' the courts have
indicated that the right to a hearing should not be based on
whether the issue concerns a right or a privilege.20 2 Yet, courts
have continued to consider the nature of the matter at issue. When
courts initially decided that fairness mandated a pre-determination
hearing for licensing considerations, they usually based such a con-
clusion on the fact that individuals had a "property right" in occu-
200. See Klein v. Lamer, 309 N.Y. 474, 480-82, 131 N.E.2d 888, 891-93 (1956) (hold-
ing that "[t]he important criteria are (1) the presence of the parties, (2) the trial and
determination of issues, and (3) a final order or judgment of rights, duties, or liabili-
ties"); Schau v. McWilliams, 185 N.Y. 92, 96-97, 77 N.E. 785, 786 (1906) (holding that
"[t]he realtor was not entitled to be sworn or to introduce witnesses"); City of New
York v. Maltbie, 53 N.Y.S.2d 234, 240, affd, 269 A.D. 662, 53 N.Y.S.2d 953, affd, 294
N.Y. 931, 63 N.E.2d. 119 (1945) ("The test seems to be that action is judicial or quasi-
judicial when, and only when, the body or officer is authorized and required to take
evidence and all the parties are entitled to notice and a hearing.")
201. See Moore v. Gallup, 267 A.D. 64, 67-68, 45 N.Y.S.2d 63, 66-67 (1943), aff d,
293 N.Y. 846, 59 N.E.2d 439 (1944) (noting that although the Second Admendment
limits Congress' power, it has no bearing on the States); Klapper v. Codd, 78 Misc.2d
377, 378, 356 N.Y.S.2d 431, 432 (1974) (holding that the right to carry a concealed
weapon is the exception rather than the rule).
202. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571, n.9 (1972) (stating that "this
Court now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a
governmental benefit is characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege'") (citing Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (stating that
in order for the government to take any administrative action that affects a right or a
privilege, the full panopoly of procedural safeguards typically imposed in court pro-
ceedings was required); Sedutto, 106 Misc.2d 304, 431 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1980) (stating
that in light of the current Supreme Court cases, they reject "the wooden distinction
between 'rights' and 'privileges' that once seemed to govern the applicability of pro-
cedural due process rights); Calhoun, 94 Misc.2d 78, 404 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1978) (holding
that absent an overriding state interest, a prior hearing is required "before taking any
property or liberty").
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pation.2 °3 The reasoning behind labeling an occupation as a right,
however, was the importance that society places on one's chosen
profession. Similar reasoning led courts to conclude that pre-de-
termination hearings were required when interests such as reputa-
tion, acquiring useful knowledge, and establishing a home were at
stake. 0 4 It would be difficult to refute the assertion that the ability
to protect one's own life is at least as important as those other in-
terests. Therefore, the application for a carry license should be
treated no differently than the revocation of such a license. A lost
life is not something that can be remedied after-the-fact. People
with serious concerns for their lives should not be forced to wait
until after administrative decisions are made to have the opportu-
nity to present their cases at a hearing.
Moreover, carry license determinations have characteristics that
suggest that the traditional judicial model should be applied.2 0 5
Private parties have demonstrated that the existing procedures are
unjust,20 6 and the lack of guidance and standards strongly suggests
that further judicialization would improve the quality of the deci-
sions.207 Hearings would provide for better judicial review, which
would in turn improve the administrative process overall.20 8 Be-
cause carry license determinations do not require complex decision
making, the costs for providing hearings should not be severe. 20 9
Furthermore, when balancing the relevant individual and govern-
ment interests at stake,210 the previously mentioned interest in pro-
tecting one's life far outweighs a governmental interest in the costs
of such procedures. Finally, to reduce costs, the State could imple-
ment a hearing-on-request system, rather than requiring one for
every carry license determination.
203. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 571-72 (noting that "[t]he Court has also made clear that
the property interests protected by procedural due process extend well beyond actual
ownership of real estate, chattels, or money").
204. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 571-72.
205. See Gifford, supra note 192, at 590 & n.9, 620 & n.174 (1977).
206. See supra notes 29, 33 and accompanying text.
207. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 102 (McKinney 1997) (stating that codes, rules, regula-
tions must be published and made available for public inspection and copying).
208. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (stating that discretionary decisions should more often be supported by
findings of facts and reasoned opinions which will improve quality of judicial review
and administrative process overall).
209. See Gifford, supra note 192 and accompanying text.
210. See Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 579-80 (D.C. Cir. 1964); see also Gif-
ford, supra note 192, at 580, n. 20.
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2. Public Information and the Right to Know
The public's "right to know," although not a traditional maxim
of due process, is another policy critical to fundamental fairness
with respect to interaction between citizens and their government.
This concept traditionally requires that laws, rules and regulations,
and judicial decisions be published. Fundamental fairness requires
that all state promulgations of rules and regulations be published
and made available to the public. 1' In respect for this principle,
cities and towns also have their own ordinances requiring notifica-
tion and publication of government rules and regulations.212 More-
over, procedural safeguards, such as the right to a hearing and a
statement of reasons behind a decision, are rendered meaningless
if the criteria governing an administrative agency's decisions are
not made public. 213 As one New York supreme court commented,
"[t]he presence of written published reasonable standards in an or-
dinance where a use is qualified by the local legislature is of the
highest importance because they inform the public of the law while
they minimize favoritism. 214
It is this concern for fairness to both the individual litigants and
to the public at large that requires all state and federal judicial de-
cisions be published. In U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner
Mall Partnership,1 5 the Supreme Court confirmed that obligation
stating that "[j]udicial precedents are presumptively correct and
valuable to the legal community as a whole. They are not merely
property of the private litigants .... 26 On the same token, the
Manual of Federal Practice requires the publishing of federal court
opinions and states that not doing so would "would injure.., the
right of the public to know what all branches of its government are
doing, and access to vital information needed for public debate
protected under the First Amendment. 217
211. See Avard v. Dupuis, 376 F.Supp. 479, 483 (D.N.H. 1974) (stating that individ-
uals cannot know what material to present, nor can they evaluate reasons for deci-
sions without public standards).
212. Little v. Young, 82 N.Y.S.2d 909, 913 (1948), affd, 274 A.D. 1005, 85 N.Y.S.2d
41 (1948), affd, 299 N.Y. 699, 87 N.E.2d 74 (1949).
213. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 102 (McKinney 1997).
214. See, e.g., NEW YORK CITY CHARTER § 1043(e) (1997); see also TOWN OF
HEMPSTEAD, N.Y. CODE, div. 1, ch. 4, § 4-3 (1998).
215. 513 U.S. 18 (1994).
216. Id. at 26 (refusing to extend the power of vacatur of judgment under review to
cases mooted by reason of settlement (quoting Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushki Kai-
sha v. U.S. Phillips Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 40 (1993)) (Stevens, J. dissenting)).
217. 2 RICHARD A. GIVENS, MANUAL OF FEDERAL PRACTICE Ch. 8 (4th ed. Supp.
1995).
152
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In the past few decades, both the federal and New York State
governments have enacted laws to make available to the public as
much information as possible regarding governmental processes
without thwarting other governmental interests. z18 The legislative
intent incorporated into the New York Freedom of Information
Law ("FOIL") provides:
The legislature hereby finds that a free society is maintained
when government is responsive and responsible to the public,
and when the public is aware of governmental actions ... [t]he
People's right to know the process of governmental decision-
making and to review the documents and statistics leading to
determinations is basic to our society.
219
FOIL mandates public access to all government records, with a few
delineated exceptions. 2 0 The relevant exceptions include certain
records or portions thereof that are specifically exempted from dis-
closure by federal or state statute, those records that would consti-
tute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy if disclosed,22'
and some records compiled for law enforcement purposes.222 An
assertion that the collection of requested material would be too
burdensome or cumbersome for the government is not a valid "de-
fense" to the necessity of disclosing the requested information.2 3
To allow such a defense "would thwart the very purpose of [FOIL]
and make possible the circumvention of the public policy embod-
ied in the Act. 224
New York courts have construed the legislative intent of FOIL
liberally, granting maximum public access, and have articulated
that any exceptions to FOIL should be highly scrutinized. 2 5 The
218. See United States Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136 (1989) (order-
ing the Department of Justice to furnish copies of district court tax decisions in its files
to magazine publisher); see also N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 84 (McKinney 1996).
219. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 84 (McKinney 1996).
220. See id.
221. See United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762 (1989). Privacy involves two kinds of interests; an interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and an interest in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions. The former is the kind pertinent to this
discussion.
222. See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87(2) (McKinney 1996).
223. See United Fed'n of Teachers v. New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 104
Misc.2d 623, 625, 428 N.Y.S.2d 823, 825 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (stating that the HHC's
"shortage of manpower" is not a defense to mandatory disclosure).
224. Id.
225. See Grossman v. Schwarz, 125 F.R.D. 376, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting that
"the purpose of the statute is to 'maximize accessibility of government documents to
the public"' (quoting In re Schwartz, 130 Misc.2d 786, 787, 497 N.Y.S.2d 834, 836
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courts have emphasized that if a statutory exemption from FOIL
exists, the government agency asserting the exception has the bur-
den of justifying it as furthering a legitimate public interest or rec-
ognizable private right.226 Even when a statutory exemption exists,
courts have not hesitated to order the disclosure of information if
the intent underlying the exemption is perverted.2 7 Moreover,
even when a FOIL exemption is applicable, courts balance the
competing governmental and "public's right to know" interests by
reading the exemption's purpose in the most narrow way possible.
Instead of approving governmental refusals to reveal any part of an
information request, courts often suggest redacting the specific in-
formation that would frustrate the exemption's purpose, such as
names and addresses, while demanding the release of the remain-
ing information to the public. 2 8
People need to be aware of the relevant law in order to follow it.
This basic notion is imperative with respect to carry licenses be-
cause the State has made no effort to articulate the meaning of
"proper cause," the only standard offered as guidance to an appli-
cant. 29 Therefore, even if licensing officials were authorized to
create regulations, it would violate basic democratic principles not
(Sur. Ct. Nassau Co. 1986) explaining that the purpose is "in order to ensure govern-
ment accountability")); Lucas v. Pastor, 117 A.D.2d 736, 498 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1986)
("FOIL was enacted to promote the people's right to know the process of governmen-
tal decision making and it is to be liberally construed to grant maximum public access
to governmental records."); American Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Sievert, 110 Misc.2d 744,
442 N.Y.S.2d 855 (Sup. Ct. 1981) ("FOIL was enacted to enhance to the fullest per-
missible extent the access of the public and the news media to records and informa-
tion in the possession of state and local governmental agencies . . . ").
226. See M. Farbman & Sons, Inc. v. New York Health and Hosps. Corp., 62 N.Y.2d
75, 83, 464 N.E.2d 437, 441 (1984) (no justification because records were not inter-
agency or intra-agency materials, or even if so, they were not statistical or factual
tabulations, or instructions to staff, or final agency policy or determinations); see also
New York Teachers Pension Ass'n, Inc. v. Teachers' Retirement Sys. of New York, 98
Misc.2d 1118, 415 N.Y.S.2d 561, affd, 71 A.D.2d 250, 422 N.Y.S.2d 389 (1979).
227. See Capital Newspapers Div. of Hearst Corp. v. Burns, 109 A.D.2d 92, 96, 490
N.Y.S.2d 651, 654 (1985), affid, 67 N.Y.2d 562, 496 N.E.2d 665 (1986) (stating that "in
enacting this statute, the legislature did not intend to create a blanket exception from
disclosure for personnel records of police officers"); see also Miracle Mile Assocs. v.
Yudelson, 68 A.D.2d 176, 417 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1979); American Broad. Cos., Inc. v.
Sievert, 110 Misc.2d 744, 442 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1981).
228. See United Fed'n of Teachers, 104 Misc.2d at 623, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 823; see gen-
erally United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press,
489 U.S. 749, 765-66 (1989).
229. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2)(f) (McKinney 1996) (requiring only that an
administrative agent determine whether proper cause exists when determining
whether to issue a carry license).
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to publish such standards.230 Regardless of whether standards cre-
ated by administrative officials are deemed "rules,' they still need
to be published in order to inform the public and minimize
favoritism. 31
Furthermore, the public's "right to know" dictates that granted
carry license applications be a matter of public record. The charac-
terization of a document as a "public record" generally means that
it is officially filed and made available for public inspection.232 In
order for a person desiring a carry license to assess the chance of
obtaining the license, she must be able to compare her situation to
that of others, so as to ascertain if she has "proper cause" for the
license. But, because granted licenses are not part of the public
record, an applicant applies with limited knowledge of her chance
of approval. That process requires her to spend several hundred
dollars and have her fingerprints taken.233 Because a denied appli-
cant has no way of knowing if that determination is "arbitrary or
capricious,' 234 her choice to appeal the decision into the state court
system also would be made blindly. That choice would require her
to spend money for an appeal without any basis for determining
her chances for success.
Because granted applications are not part of the public record,
judicial review is meaningless. 235 By definition, it is impossible to
determine whether a decision is arbitrary or capricious without
comparing the decision to others of its kind.236 Moreover, if licens-
ing determinations are to be treated as final determinations subject
only to limited judicial review, the public interest requires those
determinations to be made public like all other final determina-
tions.237 Meaningful judicial review is even more imperative with
230. See supra notes 210-213 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 210-213 and accompanying text.
232. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & RaGS. tits. 6-13, §§ 23-201 (1994); 92 N.Y. JUR.2D
RECORDS AND RECORDING § 1 (1991).
233. Having one's fingerprints taken and recorded in government. files might be
seen by some as an invasion of privacy.
234. A court will provide relief for a carry license applicant only if the administra-
tor's denial was arbitrary or capricious. See supra note 39 and accompanying text; see
also infra note 254 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 210-212 and accompanying text.
236. See Wnek Vending & Amusements Co., Inc. v. City of Buffalo, 107 Misc.2d
353, 364-67, 434 N.Y.S.2d 608, 617-18 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (citing WEBSTER'S'THIRD IN-
TERNATIONAL DICTIONARY for the following definition of capricious: "[g]iven to
changes of interest or attitude according to whims or passing fancies; not guided by
steady judgment, intent or purpose; wholly without any consistent and discriminating
standards; whimsical").
237. See supra notes 211-213 and accompanying text.
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respect to carry licenses given the loose guiding criteria of "proper
cause." The court's decision in Goldstein v. Brown238 effectively
demonstrates a finding of an arbitrary denial of a pistol license ap-
plication. The court compared the plaintiff's denied application to
the applications of others who had been granted licenses, finding
many similarities. 23 9 However, because the legislature changed Pe-
nal Law § 400 to exclude granted applications as matters of the
public record soon after the decision in Goldstein, meaningful judi-
cial review of this sort is less likely to continue.
Not only is the decision to exclude granted applications from the
public record unfair to the individual applicants, it also undermines
the very purpose of the New York State Public Information Law
and is unfair to the public as a whole. FOIL was enacted on the
theory that informing the public of government action is vital to
the functioning of a democratic society. 240 "The legislative intent
[of FOIL] ... was to increase the understanding and participation
of the public in government and to extend public accountability by
giving the public unimpaired access to the records of government
and its process of decision-making. '2 4 1 Because it appears to be
extremely difficult to obtain carry licensees' names or applications
through a FOIL request,242 it is imperative that this information be
made part of the public record. The recent scandal involving the
NYPD's licensing division 243 highlights that the present system hin-
ders, rather than furthers, informed public participation in, and ac-
countability for, gun licensing determinations.
Furthermore, the State cannot justify its complete exclusion of
granted carry license applications from the public record.244 The
State has not indicated its purpose behind the November 1994 law
change which excluded granted license applications from the public
record.245 If the State were to argue that the administrative diffi-
culty and expense of revealing such information when requested as
its purpose, such a defense would be invalid.246 The argument that
238. 189 A.D.2d 649, 592 N.Y.S.2d 343 (1993).
239. See Goldstein, 189 A.D.2d at 649. The other approved applications were ob-
tained and introduced by the request of the plaintiff's lawyer.
240. See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 84 (McKinney 1996).
241. Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc. v. Mosczydlowski, 58 A.D.2d 234,
236, 396 N.Y.S.2d 857, 859 (1977).
242. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 25-26.
244. See supra notes 210-212 and accompanying text.
245. See supra text accompanying note 31. There is no legislative history accompa-
nying the statutory revision at issue.
246. See supra notes 223-224 and accompanying text.
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the information is an invasion of privacy cannot be sustained as
under the law only the names and addresses of license carriers are
released, while the informative "need criteria" of the application is
not. The correct balance between privacy and the public's right to
know would be achieved by releasing the "need criteria" on a li-
censee's application information, but redacting the names and ad-
dresses of the applicant. By withholding the "need criteria" from
the public, the State is not only invalidly authorizing administrative
officials to determine important public policy without accountabil-
ity, but it is also allowing them to do so behind closed doors.247
C. The Availability of Judicial Review
The third, and what some may label the most important, 248 re-
quirement of an administrative law system is the availability of ju-
dicial review. An administrative agency cannot have the last word
on any action taken by it; instead, a citizen must be able to chal-
lenge the legality of such action in an independent tribunal.249 The
necessity of strict judicial review is twofold: (1) it protects against
administrative arbitrariness, 250 and (2) it enhances the integrity of
the administrative process by necessitating a framework of princi-
pled decision making in the agency.25' In reality, such review can
only protect the most egregious abuses.252
Carry license decisions are reviewed according to the procedures
of Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.253 In New York
State, Article 78 is the appropriate avenue for relief from quasi-
judicial and administrative functions,254 and the avenue through
which judicial review of rules can be made.255 Article 78 is the
"procedure for judicial review of matters that were cognizable at
common law under the prerogative writs of certiorari, mandamus
247. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(5), cmt. (McKinney Supp. 1998) ("[L]imiting
disclosure only to the name and address of the successful licensee appears too restric-
tive. It precludes access to information that would not endanger the safety of the
applicant or others but would permit public review of the propriety of the issuance of
such licenses.").
248. See Schwartz, Fashioning supra note 46, at 70 (1988).
249. See id. at 67-70.
250. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
254. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7803, cmt. 7803:1 (McKinney 1994).
255. Id.; see also N.Y. A.P.A. § 205 (McKinney 1995).
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and prohibition." '256 In an Article 78 proceeding, only four ques-
tions may be raised. They are as follows:
1. whether the body or officer failed to perform a duty enjoined
upon it by law; or
2. whether the body or officer proceeded, is proceeding or is
about to proceed without or in excess of jurisdiction; or
3. whether a determination was made in violation of lawful pro-
cedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and
capricious or an abuse of discretion, including abuse of dis-
cretion as to the measure or mode of penalty or discipline
imposed; or
4. whether a determination made as a result of a hearing held,
at which evidence was taken, pursuant to direction by law is,
on the entire record, supported by substantial evidence.257
This limited type of review is applied to administrative functions
because administrative decisions are characterized as final.258
"[R]estraint . . . is to be exercised in permitting reconsideration
even in the case of purely administrative action, to say nothing of
that which is ordinarily characterized as quasijudicial. Any general
relaxation of the rule of res judicata is inadmissible even in strictly
administrative matters. 2 59
Although Article 78 provides a uniform procedure for rights to
relief formerly available under writs of certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition, the Article did not alter the substantive law upon
which the different writs were based.26° The nature of relief avail-
able to a litigant reflects those classifications. For ministerial ac-
tions, a litigant may seek an order from a judge commanding an
administrator to act.2 61 However, certiorari is the standard of re-
view for quasi-judicial proceedings that require a hearing and are
made on record,2 62 under which a court will uphold a determina-
tion if it is supported by "substantial evidence. ' 263 That review
256. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801, cmt. 7801:1 (McKinney 1994).
257. See Gimprich, 306 N.Y. at 407-8 (referring to the availability of a "mandamus
to compel" for ministerial actions).
258. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7803 (McKinney 1994).
259. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801(1) (McKinney 1994). Article 78 cannot be used to
challenge a determination that is not final. Id.
260. Evans v. Monaghan, 306 N.Y. 312, 324, 118 N.E.2d 452, 458 (1954) (affirming
department dismissal of police officers).
261. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801, cmt. 7801:1 (McKinney 1994).
262. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7803, cmt. 7803:1 (McKinney 1994).
263. Gimprich, 306 N.Y. at 406; Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 44, 119 N.E.2d
581, 584 (1954) (citation omitted); Kopec v. Buffalo Brake Beam-Acme Steel & Mal-
leable Iron Works, 304 N.Y. 65, 67, 106 N.E.2d 12, 15 (1952) (citation omitted).
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means that the determination is to be sustained if the reviewing
court concludes that others might reasonably reach the same re-
sult.264 Carry license determinations, however, are discretionary
administrative decisions that neither require a hearing, nor are
made on the record. Consequently, in an Article 78 proceeding
such determinations are primarily reviewed under what is known
as "mandamus of review "265 to assess whether the determination
was "arbitrary or capricious 266 or affected by error of law.267 The
standards of review for certiorari and mandamus are similar, ex-
cept that a court has the benefit of a full record in certiorari re-
268view. Under both types of review, if the discretionary
determination does not meet the relevant "substantial evidence" or
"arbitrary or capricious" standard, a court may remit the matter to
the relevant agency for reconsideration 269 or it may command an
administrative officer or body to act.2
264. See supra note 254.
265. See supra note 38.
266. Scherbyn v. Boces, 77 N.Y.2d 753, 758, 573 N.E.2d 562, 565 (1991); Hochreich
v. Cudd, 68 A.D.2d 424, 426, 417 N.Y.S.2d 498, 500 (1979); Berstein v. Police Dep't of
New York, 85 A.D.2d 574, 444 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1981). The Court of Appeals has con-
strued the "arbitrary or capricious" standard to mean that the action was taken with-
out sound basis in reason or without regard to the facts. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7803,
cmt. 7803:2 (McKinney 1994) (citing Pell v. Board of Ed. of Union Free Sch. Dist.
No.1 of Scarsdale and Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 N.Y.2d 222, 313 N.E.2d
321, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1974) (Capricious has also been defined as "given to changes
of interest or attitude according to whims or passing fancies; not guided by steady
judgment, intent or purpose; wholly without any consistent and discriminating stan-
dards, whimsical."); Wnek Vending & Amusements Co. v. City of Buffalo, 107
Misc.2d 353, 366, 434 N.Y.S.2d 608, 617-18 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (quoting WEBSTER'S
THIRD INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY)).
267. See Scherbyn, 77 N.Y.2d at 758.
268. See id. at 757; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7803, cmt. 7803:1 (McKinney 1994).
269. See Rochester Colony, Inc. v. Hostetter, 19 A.D.2d 250, 254-55, 241 N.Y.S.2d
210, 215 (1963).
270. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7806 (McKinney 1996) ("The judgment may grant the pe-
titioner the relief to which he is entitled .... If the proceeding was brought to review
a determination, the judgment ... may direct or prohibit specified action by respon-
dent."); Wyoming v. Criminal Justice, 83 A.D.2d 25, 27 443 N.Y.S.2d 898, 901 (1981)
(explaining that an order to compel is appropriate remedy for discretionary action if
"abused by arbitrary or illegal action"); Britton Realty Co. v. State Div. of Hous. and
Community Renewal, 141 Misc.2d 683, 685, 534 N.Y.S.2d 98, 99 (Sup. Ct. 1988); Gar-
rett v. Coughlin, 128 A.D.2d 210, 212, 516 N.Y.S.2d 796, 797 (1987). But some courts
have indicated that this type of relief can only be achieved if the litigant shows that he
or she has a clear legal right to the execution of that act. See Gimprich, 118 N.E.2d at
580 (stating that this type of relief is available to acts that involve no exercise of
discretion); Hamptons Hosp. & Medical Ctr., Inc. v. Moore, 52 N.Y.2d 88, 96, 417
N.E.2d 533, 537, 436 N.Y.S.2d 239, 243 (1981); Baressi v. Biggs, 203 A.D. 2, 4, 196
N.Y.S. 376, 379-80 (1922) (citations omitted).
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In order to provide a basis for judicial review, all administrative
decisions should include findings and conclusions, and the reasons
or basis therefore on all material issues of fact, law or discretion.271
Proper judicial review to determine whether an act was arbitrary or
capricious also "requires disclosure of the standard which the ad-
ministrative agent has applied. ' 272 The standards must be objec-
tive and delineated in order to have meaningful judicial review.273
In fact, the Court of Appeals has held that where rules delegate
unfettered discretion with inadequate safeguards against the exer-
cise of arbitrary power or simple unfairness, administrative denials
under those rules are arbitrary and capricious as a matter of law.274
Other courts have compared similar agency determinations in or-
der to gauge whether a decision was arbitrary or capricious. In
Application of Fitzgerald,275 for example, a supreme court deter-
mined that the Public Service Commission acted "arbitrar[ily] and
capricious[ly]" because "[i]t approved leases in four identical cases
and then on the same proof denied Fitzgerald like relief for no rea-
son whatever. 276
In New York, carry license determinations reviewed in Article 78
proceedings are reviewed on mandamus, primarily to assess
whether the determination was arbitrary or capricious.277 Unless
the licensing officer commits an error of law or acts arbitrarily or
capriciously in some other way, the officer's judgment is final and
the courts may not interfere.278 In the rare instance that a court
has sensed that a challenged carry license determination was arbi-
trary or capricious, however, the court remanded the case for fur-
ther explanation rather than compel the issuance of the license.
271. See Illinois v. United States, 371 F.Supp. 1.136-38 (N.D. Ill. 1973); see also
O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 589, 489 N.E.2d 712, 718, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 751
(1985) (stating that no intelligent review of the broad discretion entrusted to a trial
judge is possible unless the judge reveals the factors considered and the reasoning
behind his decision).
272. See In Re Montauk Improvement, Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 913, 914, 363 N.E.2d 344,
345, 394 N.Y.S.2d 619, 620 (1977); see also Wnek Vending, 107 Misc.2d at 361, 434
N.Y.S.2d at 614-15.
273. See Nicholas v. Kahn, 47 N.Y.2d 24, 33, 389 N.E.2d 1086, 1091, 416 N.Y.S.2d
565, 570 (1979).
274. See id. at 34.
275. 262 Misc. 393, 29 N.Y.S.2d 9 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
276. Id. at 397.
277. See, e.g., Hochreich v. Codd, 68 A.D.2d 424, 426, 417 N.Y.S.2d 498, 500 (1979);
Bernstein v. Police Dep't of the City of New York, 85 A.D.2d 574, 445 N.Y.S.2d 716
(1981).
278. See Dorf v. Fielding, 20 Misc.2d 18, 20, 197 N.Y.S.2d 280, 283 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
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Because Penal Law § 400 does not provide any standards, any
decision under the scheme is capricious.279 The necessity of finding
such determinations capricious is not dependent on whether the
officer is applying standards uniformly, but rather whether he has
the discretion not to do so. 280 Therefore, when carry license appli-
cants appeal their denials, courts should declare Penal Law § 400
unenforceable. 28 1 Even if administrative officers are uniformly ap-
plying predetermined criteria for the issuance of carry licenses
without looking into the facts of each case (i.e., if only carrying a
specific amount of money suffices to obtain a license), determina-
tions made under that scheme would be inherently arbitrary and
capricious because those criteria are not published.282 Yet a court
would not even be able to determine if licensing officers are apply-
ing established criteria because the unavailability of granted appli-
cations to the public prevents an applicant from putting forth
evidence of "need criteria" previously found to constitute proper
cause.
D. Summary
The New York State Constitution mandates that if the legislature
delegates any of its powers, it must provide sufficient guidelines for
administration of those powers. 83 Under this mandate, Penal Law
§ 400, which effectively grants unfettered discretion to administra-
tive officials over carry licenses, is unconstitutional. Moreover,
even if New York State adopted the federal constitutional standard
of permitting the liberal delegation of authority as long as sufficient
procedural safeguards exist,284 the statute would fail because it vio-
lates basic notions of fundamental fairness-few, if any, procedural
safeguards exist. No predetermination hearings are provided and
thus no information is made on record. Yet, even in the absence of
a record, the standard for judicial review is a deferential one.
Moreover, without sufficient justification, licensees' applications
279. See supra text accompanying notes 269-272; see also Nicholas, 47 N.Y.2d at 33.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 269-272.
281. See Nicholas, 47 N.Y.2d at 33 (stating that exemption to prohibition of em-
ployee ownership of utility stocks and bonds cannot be enforced until amended be-
cause it delegates unfettered discretion to administrative agent).
282. See Sunrise Manor Nursing Home v. Axelrod, 135 A.D.2d 293, 296-97, 525
N.Y.S.2d 367, 369-70 (1988) (holding that department of health's determination was
arbitrary and capricious because it applied an unpublished fixed and rigid policy that
predetermined application without regard to its merits).
283. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 52.
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are no longer part of the public record. Thus, judicial review is
meaningless, since a decision regarding whether a determination is
arbitrary or capricious by definition can only be made by compar-
ing an applicant to objective standards, or other determinations,
neither of which are readily available to a judge.
Il. Proposed Changes
A. The Legislature Should Change the Current System
The New York State legislature should amend Penal Law § 400
to include defined factors that administrative officials should con-
sider when determining whether an applicant has shown "proper
cause" for the issuance of a carry license. 285 To ensure meaningful
judicial review, and because an applicant's safety is often at issue,
the legislature should also require the license issuing agency to
grant an applicant a hearing made on the record upon request.
Moreover, the legislature should make the applications of persons
granted carry licenses, and the determinations on those applica-
tions, available for public review. By allowing the public to com-
pare the determinations of various different applications, the
process can cease appearing arbitrary and capricious.
B. The Courts Should Take Action
1. Declare Penal Law § 400 Invalid
The New York courts should declare Penal Law § 400 an uncon-
stitutional delegation of power and violative of due process if the
legislature does not make the above proposed changes to the
statute.
2. Compel the Issuance of Carry Licenses
If the Legislature does not set forth objective guidelines for the
issuance of carry licenses, and determinations are not made part of
the public record, courts should find all denials of carry license de-
terminations made pursuant to Penal Law § 400 "arbitrary and ca-
pricious." Further, when they declare these determinations
"arbitrary and capricious," courts should compel the issuance of a
license2 86 rather than remit the matter for further review.
Courts need to compare decisions to determine if objective crite-
ria exist. Penal Law § 400 is unenforceable, however, regardless of
285. See supra note 115 for examples of comparable statutes from other states.
286. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
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whether objective criteria are discovered. If there are no objective
criteria, courts should compel the administrative body issuing carry
licenses to grant licenses to persons challenging denials, because
decisions made without guiding criteria are inherently arbitrary
and capricious. On the other hand, if the licensing official has es-
tablished objective criteria, courts should also compel the issuance
of licenses. Because the creation of such standards is outside the
scope of licensing officials' authority, determinations made pursu-
ant to such unpublished standards are accordingly arbitrary and
capricious.287
3. Classify Carry License Determinations and Mandate the
Appropriate Requirements of Classification
New York law has not been clear regarding whether carry license
determinations should be characterized as legislative, judicial or
ministerial. Yet, the not-readily-identifiable nature of carry license
determinations cannot be used to mask the unconstitutional attrib-
utes of the system. Because such determinations do not fall neatly
into one category, a carry license applicant receives none of the
protections or advantages of any branch of the government.
Courts should therefore classify carry license determinations within
the purview of one branch so as to ensure that the requirements of
that classification for fair procedure and judicial review are carried
out.
This article argues that carry license determinations are of a
quasi-judicial nature, and therefore should be classified as adjudi-
catory proceedings. 288 Accordingly, courts should mandate that
applicants are afforded an opportunity for a predetermination
hearing made on the record upon request.289 Courts should also
require the responsible agencies to make those determinations
available to the public in order to afford potential applicants mean-
ingful review by comparison. Courts should employ a certiorari
standard of review, affirming determinations only if they are sup-
ported by substantial evidence set forth in the record.
However, even if New York courts conclude that carry license
determinations do not require hearings because they are not adju-
dicatory, but rather legislative or administrative, then the appli-
cable requirements of that branch must be applied consistently
throughout the licensing process. For example, if licensing is con-
287. See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
288. See discussion infra Part II.A.
289. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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sidered legislative, courts should enforce the State Administrative
Procedure Act requirement that such determinations be published.
If licensing is considered administrative, deferential review should
not be the standard of review because of the uneven results of the
review process in the past. The courts should look closely into the
facts of the case and the "standard" for granting a license, and
mandate the issuance of a license if warranted, rather than defer-
ring to the discretion of the licensing official.290
4. Provide More Aggressive Review
If courts choose not to compel the issuance of carry licenses, and
if carry license determinations are not officially classified as adjudi-
catory, legislative, or ministerial, New York courts should at a min-
imum apply a qualified or a relaxed set of res judicata2 91 rules to
such determinations. The courts should not simply defer to the li-
censing officer's decision, but should look more closely at the facts
of the case.
The conclusion that res judicata is applicable to administrative
decisions as final decisions should be subject to the same excep-
tions that apply to judicial decisions, including inadequacy of op-
portunity to be heard. 92 Because the carry licensing decision-
making process in New York State does not provide applicants
with an opportunity to be heard, the traditional exceptions to res
judicata require that the strict application of the doctrine to carry
license determinations be abolished.293 Furthermore, administra-
tive decisions may require additional exceptions.2 94 "Whenever
the traditional rules of res judicata do not work well as applied to
particular administrative action, those rules may be weakened...
without destroying the essential service of the doctrine of res judi-
cata in preventing the same parties or their privies from unnecessa-
rily litigating the same question a second time . . "295 One
commentator on administrative law has stated that an intermediate
290. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
291. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1305-06 (6th ed. 1990) defines "res judicata" as the
"[riule that a final judgment ... on the merits is conclusive ... [and] constitutes an
absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim .... [A] matter once
judicially decided is finally decided."
292. See KENNETH CULP DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 565-66 (1951).
293. See id.
294. See id.
295. Id. at 566.
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level of res judicata is fully supported in the practices of agencies
and holdings of courts, although not articulated as such.296
The "arbitrary or capricious" standard of review, often cited for
its limitations regarding judicial relief, provides another reason
why courts should be more aggressive in their review. Action is
not "arbitrary or capricious," even if an erroneous conclusion is
reached, as long as the agency has acted honestly and upon due
consideration of the facts.297 Unlike the "clearly erroneous" stan-
dard, the "arbitrary or capricious" standard does not mandate a
review of the entire record and all the evidence. Furthermore, the
"arbitrary or capricious" standard does not consider public policy
contained in the legislative act authorizing the decision.298
Courts lack the authority to change the applicable "arbitrary or
capricious" standard of review.299 Courts can, however, rectify the
inadequacies of the arbitrary or capricious standard which are mag-
nified in carry licensing by the lack of many constitutional require-
ments for an administrative scheme. Courts should require the
government to produce detailed evidence showing both its reason
for denying each application, and why such reasoning is not arbi-
trary or capricious.3 0
Conclusion
Although the creation of administrative systems may have be-
come a necessary component of modern democratic government,
such systems must not compromise the ideals fundamental to a
democratic state. The system for administering licenses to carry
concealed weapons in New York State violates the State's constitu-
tion in that it enables elected officials to avoid difficult decision
making and lacks proper procedures to ensure fair application.
The sole "proper cause" standard for the issuance of a carry license
is the equivalent of a standardless delegation, which, in effect,
296. See id.
297. Kelly Kunsch, Standard of Review (State and Federal): A Primer, 18 SEATrLE
U. L. REV. 11, 41 (1994).
298. Id. at 42 (citing Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Ass'n v. King County
Council, 87 Wash.2d 267, 274, 552 P.2d 674, 678-79 (1976)).
299. See Pokola v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Co., 963 F. Supp 1361, 1371
(D.N.J. 1997) ("Courts have not required a plan to explicitly identify the applicable
standard of review before applying the arbitrary and capricious standard." (citing
Firestone Tire Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 ("Where discretion is conferred upon the
trustee with respect to the exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject to control by
the court except to prevent an abuse by the trustee of his discretion".))).
300. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
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grants unelected and unaccountable administrative officials the dis-
cretion to apply their own public policy on gun control.
Moreover, the State is exploiting the elusive character of gun li-
censing by denying procedural safeguards required for adjudica-
tory proceedings but not for ministerial ones, and then granting
deferential judicial review only afforded to adjudicatory proceed-
ings and not to ministerial ones. This lack of fairness in the proce-
dures provided in the current administrative scheme is
compounded by the undemocratic practice of keeping information
from the public. Whatever criteria is being used by the licensing
officials to make carry license determinations, it is revealed to
neither the license applicant nor the public at large.
Both the New York legislature and courts must act to rectify the
state's unconstitutional and undemocratic administrative scheme
for issuing carry licenses. The legislature must express its will re-
garding gun control by creating more definitive standards for ad-
ministrative officials to apply than the current amorphous "proper
cause" standard. The quasi-judicial nature of gun licensing, as well
as the safety and protection concerns predicating applications for
carry licenses, mandate that carry license applicants be offered a
predetermination hearing. Finally, the legislature must require
that license applications be made part of the public record in order
to ensure meaningful judicial review.
